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MICHAEL C. BLUMM* & JANE G. STEADMAN**
Indian Treaty Fishing Rights and
Habitat Protection: The Martinez
Decision Supplies a Resounding
Judicial Reaffirmation
ABSTRACT
In the nineteenth century, the federal government convinced many
Pacific Northwest tribes to enter into treaties that would facilitate
white settlement. These treaties resulted in tribes ceding millions of
acres of homeland in exchange for the right to take fish from all the
usual and accustomed places. Although it was assumed that the
salmon resource was inexhaustible at the time of the treaties, the
salmon have been in precipitous decline since the late 1800s. This
increasing scarcity bred conflicts, which forced the tribes to enforce
their treaty fishing right in federal courts. This article explores the
history of the treaty fishing right from 1905 to the present, tracing
the evolution of the treaty fishing right in federal courts—from a
right of access, to a right to a fair share of the salmon harvest, to a
right of habitat protection. In particular, the article examines the
2007 Martinez Decision, which affirmed that the treaty fishing
right prohibits habitat-damaging activities that prevent tribes from
earning a moderate living through fishing. The article concludes that
this decision is the logical progeny of over a century’s worth of pre-
cedent, and that the result is consistent with common law principles
of profits.
INTRODUCTION
In the 1850s, in order to facilitate white settlement of the Pacific
Northwest,1 the federal government’s negotiators drafted and convinced
* Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. Thanks to David Cummings, Peter
Monson, Michael O’Connell, John Sledd, and Fronda Woods for their assistance, none of
whom have endorsed the views expressed nor the conclusions reached in this article. This
article is dedicated to the memory of Tim Weaver, a vigilant defender of the rights of the
Yakama Nation, which possesses Stevens’ Treaty fishing rights.
** Legal Analyst, Recreation Planning Program, The Wilderness Society. J.D. and
Certificate in Environmental and Natural Resources Law 2009, Lewis & Clark Law School;
B.A. 2001 (Biology), Kalamazoo College.
1. See MICHAEL C. BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF
THE DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON 56 (2002) [hereinafter SACRIFICING THE SALMON]
(indicating Congress passed a statute in 1850 authorizing treaty negotiations with the
Northwest Tribes in response to white settlement of Oregon Territory); Kent Richards, The
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numerous indigenous tribes to sign treaties ceding vast quantities of tri-
bal lands, while assuring the tribes that they would retain “the right of
taking fish at all usual and accustomed [places] in common with [white
settlers].”2 The tribes signing the treaties were, as one federal district
judge determined, singularly dependent on salmon for their subsistence,
economy, and culture.3 The government’s chief negotiator, Isaac Ingalls
Stevens, explicitly proclaimed to the natives at one treaty signing that
“[t]his paper [the treaty] secures your fish.”4 The tribes5 that signed the
Stevens Treaties of 1854–1855: An Introduction, 106.3 OR. HIST. Q. 342, 342 ¶¶ 8–11 (2005),
available at http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ohq/106.3/richards.html
(describing factors leading to need for treaties). See generally CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
MESSAGES FROM FRANK’S LANDING: A STORY OF SALMON, TREATIES, AND THE INDIAN WAY
(2000).
2. See, e.g., Treaty of Medicine Creak, U.S.-Nisqually, Puyallup, S’Homamish, Sa-heh-
wamish, Squawskin, Squi-aitl, Stehchass, Steilacoom, T’Peeksin, art. 3, Dec. 26, 1854, 10
Stat. 1132, 1133. There were 10 other treaties with similar language. See Jack L. Landau,
Empty Victories: Indian Treaty Fishing Rights in the Pacific Northwest, 10 ENVTL. L. 413, 417
n.26 (1980) (providing citations to all eleven treaties). In the treaties, the tribes ceded Indian
title to the government. Indian (or aboriginal) title was a possessory right to historic territo-
ries, but it did not include the right to alienate to anyone other than the sovereign. See
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823) (denying rights of “chiefs” to convey clear title
to land speculators and arguing that “[upon discovery, Indians] were admitted to be the
rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and
to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at
their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental prin-
ciple, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it”). One of us has described
Indian title as the equivalent of a fee simple subject to a federal right of preemption. See
Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal Title, Tribal Sovereignty, and
their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural Resources Policy in Indian Country, 28
VT. L. REV. 713, 741 (2004).
3. See United States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), 384 F. Supp. 312, 406 (W.D. Wash.
1974), aff’d sub nom. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). Due to the primacy of fish harvests to tribal culture, religion,
diet, and economy, the treaty negotiators understood that protection of historic fishing
rights was a precondition to the signing of any treaties. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra
note 1, at 62; Robert J. Miller, Speaking with Forked Tongues: Indian Treaties, Salmon, and the R
Endangered Species Act, 70 OR. L. REV. 543, 551–52 (1991) (describing significance of salmon
to Indian tribes and circumstances of treaty negotiations); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COM-
MITTEE, UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY: FISHING RIGHTS OF THE MUCKLESHOOT, PUYALLUP, AND
NISQUALLY INDIANS xxvi (1970) (“Fishing is more than a right, more than a way to make a
living. It is a way of life—a part of life itself, an integral part of the whole artistic, religious,
economic, and social life of the Northwest Coast Indians.”).
4. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DIV. OF FORESTRY &
GRAZING, REPORT ON SOURCE, NATURE, AND EXTENT OF THE FISHING, HUNTING AND MISCEL-
LANEOUS RELATED RIGHTS OF CERTAIN INDIAN TRIBES IN WASHINGTON AND OREGON 348 (July
1942), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/history/publications_view_pdf.aspx?i=sl_
indianaffarisreport/SL_indianaffairsreport.pdf.Stevens was not only the government’s
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treaties relied on assurances like this in ceding some 64 million acres of
land. The Stevens treaties, as they came to be called, facilitated one of the
largest peaceful real estate transfers in the history of the world, in which
the tribes retained only small reservations as homelands.6 There was no
need for large reservations, the government negotiators confidently in-
formed the tribes, because the off-reservation fishing right would pro-
vide the tribes with the means to a livelihood at minimal cost to the
government.7
When the treaties were signed, the universally shared assumption
was that the salmon resource was inexhaustible.8 But even before the end
of the nineteenth century, northwest salmon runs were in precipitous
treaty negotiator, but also the governor of the Washington territory, the territory’s superin-
tendent of Indian affairs, and a surveyor of a potential transcontinental railroad. SACRIFIC-
ING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 57. Stevens was “a young and ambitious R
politician . . . determined to facilitate rapid white settlement.” Id. at 59.
5. Governor Stevens and his assistant, lawyer and ethnologist George Gibbs, organ-
ized bands of Indians into tribes for the purpose of negotiating the treaties, arbitrarily as-
signing some bands a subordinate or dominate role in the tribes they organized. They
appointed friendly chiefs on the basis of whether they could speak Chinook jargon, a 300-
word trade language that was the language of the treaty negotiations. SACRIFICING THE
SALMON, supra note 1, at 59–60. To this day, the tribes regard the beginning of their political R
identity as the date of the treaty signings. Id. at 62.
6. Id. at 57 (noting the tribes ceded 64 million acres in nine treaties, retaining less than
six million acres). In addition to retention of the right to fish at places and small reserva-
tions of land, the tribes received $1.2 million in exchange for the 64 million acres. Id. See also
Miller, supra note 3, at 552–55 (relating circumstances under which treaties were R
negotiated).
7. The federal government aimed to keep expenditures for the tribes at a minimum
by allowing the tribes to maintain economic self-sufficiency through fishing. See SACRIFIC-
ING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 5; United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), No. CV R
9213RSM, 2007 WL 2437166, at *8 (W.D. Wash.) (quoting historian Richard White to the
effect that “[w]hat Stevens and his negotiators explicitly promised in response to Indian
objections was access to the usual places for procuring food and continued economic ex-
change with the whites. . . . By guaranteeing the Indians a right to their share of the
bounty of the land, rivers, and Sound, the treaties would enable them to feed themselves at
little cost to the government.”).
8. See Martinez Decision, 2007 WL 2437166, at *9 (quoting historian Joseph E. Taylor,
“Indians had no reason to believe during the period of treaty negotiations that white set-
tlers would interfere, either directly through their own harvest or indirectly through their
environmental impacts, with Indian fisheries in the future. . . . Indians, like whites, as-
sumed that their cherished fisheries would remain robust forever.”); Washington v. Wash.
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n (Passenger Fishing Vessel), 443 U.S. 658,
669 (1979) (“In sum, it is fair to conclude that when the treaties were negotiated, neither
party realized or intended that their agreement would determine whether, and if so how, a
resource that had always been thought inexhaustible would be allocated . . . when it later
became scarce.”), aff’g United States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D.
Wash. 1974).
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decline due to new harvest technologies (mostly employed by non-Indi-
ans), increased white population, and the demands of distant markets.9
This scarcity bred conflicts and the tribes attempted to enforce their
treaty rights in the courts. As a result of these adjudications, the treaty
promise of the “right of taking fish” became the subject of numerous
court opinions, including no fewer than seven U.S. Supreme Court opin-
ions between 1905 and 1979.10 In the last of these decisions, the Court
affirmed District Judge George Boldt’s historic determination that the “in
common with” language in the treaties guaranteed tribal fishers more
9. Prior to the influx of white settlers from the east, “as many as 30 million wild
salmon and [steelhead] may have returned to the rivers and streams of Washington annu-
ally.” PAUL WAGNER & PAUL SEKULICH, FISH PASSAGE TASK FORCE REPORT TO THE LEGISLA-
TURE 6 (1997) [hereinafter FISH PASSAGE TASK FORCE REPORT]. The Columbia River likely
supported 16 million salmon. See id. By the late nineteenth century, more efficient and dev-
astating harvest technologies like fish wheels, drift nets, and weirs, fed ravenous cannery
operations that sprung up along the Columbia River. SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note
1, at 5–6. These new techniques, as well as increased demand for canned salmon from the R
local white population and newly accessible eastern markets (primarily opened through
new railroads) led to decimation of the salmon runs before the turn of the century. Id. In
1883, for example, the lower Columbia River harvest produced 43 million pounds of chi-
nook, while just seven years later the amount was half that. Id. See also Manuel Nikel-
Zueger, Saving Salmon the American Indian Way, PROP. & ENV’T RESEARCH CTR. POLICY SE-
RIES, Nov. 2003, at 12–13 (describing how canning expanded the market for salmon), availa-
ble at http:/www/perc.org/pdf/ps29.pdf. More recently, dams, timber harvests, grazing,
industrial pollution, and hatcheries (among other activities), diminished the already strug-
gling salmon runs. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary
Profit and Habitat Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO.
L. REV. 407, 409 n.5 (1998) (estimating annual Columbia Basin salmon runs at 10 to 16
million adult fish historically but below 1 million in 1994).
10. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (finding that a treaty right guarantees
tribes access across private property to reach their historic fisheries); Seufert Bros. Co. v.
United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919) (noting that the tribal access right burdens lands that a
tribe did not expressly cede in its treaty, but which its members used historically); Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942) (finding that a state cannot burden the treaty fishing right
by requiring tribal fishers to purchase state licenses); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game of
Wash. (Puyallup I), 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (finding that a state can regulate tribal harvests in
the interest of conservation if it is nondiscriminatory); Dep’t of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup
Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (deciding that a state ban of net fishing in favor of
hook-and-line fishing was not a nondiscriminatory regulation due to its effects on tribal
fishing); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game of Wash. (Puyallup III), 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (up-
holding negotiated allocation of harvests between tribal and nontribal fishers, even after a
lower court decision determined that the tribe’s reservation still existed); Washington v.
Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n (Passenger Fishing Vessel), 443 U.S.
658 (1979) (finding that a treaty fishing right includes a right to harvest up to one-half the
available harvest, subject to conservation needs). For a discussion of these cases that de-
scribes the Indian treaty fishing right cases in detail, see generally SACRIFICING THE SALMON,
supra note 1, ch. 4; Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 457–59. R
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than an equal opportunity to fish alongside white fishers; instead, the
treaties assured them up to half of the harvest.11
In the Boldt Decision—as it came to be called—originally filed in
1970, the tribes not only asked the court to declare that the treaties enti-
tled them to a share of the salmon harvest, they also maintained that (1)
their harvest share should include hatchery fish, and (2) their “right of
taking fish” included the right to salmon habitat protection.12 Judge Boldt
deferred these two issues while he considered the allocation issue, and
subsequently retired, thus leaving these two critical questions
unanswered.13
Ensuing judges had little difficulty resolving the hatchery fish is-
sue in the tribes’ favor,14 but the habitat issue remained unresolved for
some 37 years. Although a federal district judge, Judge William Orrick,
concluded in 1980 that the treaties included a habitat protection right,15
an en banc Ninth Circuit ultimately decided five years later that it was
unwise to resolve the habitat issue in the absence of a concrete factual
controversy.16 For over two decades after that decision, the issue sim-
mered as the tribes looked for a suitable concrete factual controversy that
did not implicate the federal government, whose support the tribes
wanted in the litigation.17
In 2001, the tribes, along with the federal government, finally initi-
ated action against the State of Washington, alleging that the State’s con-
struction and maintenance of highway and railroad culverts that block
salmon migration violated the treaty fishing right.18 After an unsuccess-
11. See Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 682, 686–87.
12. See United States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), 384 F. Supp. 312, 328 (W.D. Wash.
1974), aff’d sub nom. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 669 (1979); see also United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020
(W.D. Wash. 1978).
13. On Judge Boldt, see infra note 74. R
14. United States v. Washington (Orrick Decision), 506 F. Supp. 187, 200–02 (W.D.
Wash. 1980), aff’d. in part and vacated in part, 759 F.2d 1353, 1358–60 (9th Cir. 1985).
15. Orrick Decision, 506 F. Supp. at 203–04, 208.
16. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d at 1357 (worrying that articulating legal rules
in the absence of concrete facts would produce results that would be “imprecise in defini-
tion and uncertain in dimension”).
17. The litigation was, after all, a continuation of the case filed in 1970, in which the
lead plaintiff was the federal government. The State tried unsuccessfully to seek injunctive
and declaratory relief against the federal government. United States v. Washington (Marti-
nez Decision), 2007 WL 2437166, at *1 (dismissing the State’s counterclaims on basis that
federal sovereign immunity was not waived).
18. Technically, the tribes initiated a sub-proceeding under the continuing jurisdiction
of the original United States v. Washington case, which began in 1970. Id.
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ful attempt to settle the case,19 Federal District Judge Ricardo S. Martinez
ruled that the treaties forbade the State from constructing and maintain-
ing highway culverts that blocked salmon migration, which, in turn, im-
permissibly reduced the number of salmon available for harvest.20 This
short and uncomplicated 2007 decision is certainly the most important
treaty fishing right decision since the Supreme Court’s affirmation of
Judge Boldt nearly 30 years ago.21 The Martinez Decision, following the
“common-sense” proposition that Judge Orrick recognized so long
ago22—and with which several Ninth Circuit judges agreed23—suggested
that the treaties protect the habitat of the salmon and that such protec-
tion is the central consideration of the treaties.24 The decision not only
promises to revolutionize culvert construction and maintenance in
Washington, it may also equip the tribes with the ability to obtain judi-
cial scrutiny of a number of salmon habitat-damaging activities, such as
timber harvesting, grazing, and dam operations.
This article explains the treaty fishing right and its habitat protec-
tion dimension in light of the Martinez Decision. Part I begins with a brief
exploration of the history of treaty fishing right litigation, beginning with
the foundational case of United States v. Winans through the Puyallup tril-
ogy. Part II examines the Boldt Decision, its affirmation by the Supreme
19. See id. (indicating that parties were unable to reach an agreement after six years of
settlement discussions).
20. Id. at 12. Judge Martinez, a Seattle native and University of Washington graduate,
was nominated to the federal district court for the Western District of Washington by Presi-
dent George W. Bush in 2003 and confirmed by the Senate in 2004. Wash. State Bar Ass’n,
Hon. Ricardo S. Martinez, United States District Court Judge, Western District of Washing-
ton, http://www.wsba.org/martinez.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
21. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658 (1979), is discussed in Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 455–59. R
22. In the Orrick Decision, the court found:
The most fundamental prerequisite to exercising the right to take fish is
the existence of fish to be taken. . . . [A]n environmentally-acceptable
habitat is essential to the survival of the fish, without which the expressly-
reserved right to take fish would be meaningless and valueless. Thus, it is
necessary to recognize an implied environmental right in order to fulfill
the purposes of the fishing clause.
United States v. Washington (Orrick Decision), 506 F. Supp. 187, 203–05 (W.D. Wash. 1980)
23. See United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1367–68 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, and Norris, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See also infra notes 123 and 129 and accompanying text. R
24. United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), No. CV 9213RSM, 2007 WL
2437166, at *10 (W.D. Wash.). Shortly after Judge Martinez’s ruling, the parties entered
settlement negotiations to decide upon the remedy, but the negotiations have failed. Email
from Fronda Woods, Associate Attorney General, State of Washington Attorney General’s
Office, to Jane Steadman, Law Student, Lewis & Clark Law School (Oct. 9, 2008) (on file
with authors). Consequently, the parties are preparing for trial on the remedy issue. Id.
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Court, and the ensuing hatchery salmon decision. Part III explains the
judicial evolution of the habitat protection issue during the late twentieth
century. Part IV considers the effects of road culverts on salmon and the
value of using culverts as the factual vehicle to crystallize the right to
habitat protection. Part V, the heart of the article, analyzes Judge Marti-
nez’s decision and its implications. Part VI describes cases preceding the
Martinez Decision that foreshadowed judicial affirmation of the right to
habitat protection. Part VII considers a couple of crucial issues that the
Martinez Decision did not resolve: (1) the role of the federal government
in habitat protection and (2) the scope of the remedy that the court
should prescribe. The article concludes that, if the Martinez Decision sur-
vives appeal, it will be the most important treaty fishing rights decision
since the Supreme Court’s affirmation of Judge Boldt. Given the federal
government’s duplicitous and ineffectual approach to salmon restora-
tion,25 the decision could be a vehicle to make the nineteenth-century
treaty promises considerably more important to salmon restoration than
the twentieth century Endangered Species Act listings.26
I. TREATY FISHING RIGHTS FROM WINANS TO THE
PUYALLUP TRILOGY: A BRIEF HISTORY
From the start, it was clear that the mere signing of treaties reserv-
ing the “right of taking fish in common” with white settlers would pro-
vide little protection to tribal members’ ability to actualize that right.27
Within 30 years of signing the Stevens treaties, conflicts between settlers
and tribal members over fishing rights became frequent and fierce.28 The
natives came to understand that if they were to exercise their right to fish
25. See generally Michael C. Blumm et al., Practiced at the Art of Deception: The Failure of
Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 36 ENVTL. L. 709 (2006).
26. See id.
27. Conflicts between landowner settlers and tribal fishers were commonplace
throughout the Columbia Basin in the years following the Civil War. For some of the de-
tails, see Michael C. Blumm & James Brunberg, “Not Much Less Necessary. . .Than the Atmos-
phere They Breathed”: Salmon, Indian Treaties, and the Supreme Court—A Centennial
Remembrance of United States v. Winans and Its Enduring Significance, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J.
489, 506–16 (2006) (noting “violent friction ensued between Indians and the first wave of
settlers” upon Governor Stevens’s announcement of available lands ceded by the Indians
shortly after the treaties were signed). See also JOSEPH C. DUPRIS ET AL., THE SI’LAILO WAY:
INDIANS, SALMON AND LAW ON THE COLUMBIA RIVER ch. 4 (2006) (describing conflicts be-
tween Indians and non-Indians over access to fisheries).
28. See, e.g., DUPRIS ET AL., supra note 27, at 59–60 (noting the landowners’ use of “lock- R
outs” to preclude Indian access to fisheries forcing the Indians to resort to the self-help
remedy of break-ins to gain access); Miller, supra note 3, at 555 (indicating a “minor land R
rush” followed Stevens’s opening of lands post-treaty signing, which led to a war between
Indians and non-Indians); Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 27, at 504–05 (explaining that R
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at all, they would need the help of the courts to enforce it.29 Litigation
over the meaning of the treaty fishing right began in 1884 and continues
to present.30 Over the years, courts identified a trinity of rights implicit in
the treaty fishing clause—a right of access, a right to a fair share of the
harvest, and a right to habitat protection.31 This section explores the chro-
nology of cases explicating the access right.
The first major legal battle involved the question of whether the
treaty fishing right included a right of access to historic fishing
grounds.32 Each of the Stevens treaties reserved for tribal members the
right to take fish at “all usual and accustomed places.”33 By the late nine-
teenth century, many homesteaders had begun fencing off land with
river access in an effort to exclude Indians from the ceded land or from
the historic fisheries.34
“violent friction ensued between Indians and the first wave of settlers” upon announce-
ment by Stevens of the availability of lands ceded by the Indians).
29. See Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 27, at 505, 524. R
30. See id. at 506 n.89.
31. See O. Yale Lewis III, Treaty Fishing Rights: A Habitat Right As Part of the Trinity of
Rights Implied by the Fishing Clause of the Stevens Treaties, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 281, 283
(2002–2003).
32. See Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 27, at 506 n.89 (2006) (indicating “[t]he first R
recorded case involving treaty-fishing access” involved the “Tumwater” fishery, which was
decided in 1884) (citation omitted)).
33. DUPRIS ET AL., supra note 27, at 8–9 (describing inheritability of fishing sites). It has R
also been noted:
Ownership of fishing sites meant more than merely the right to fish in that
place. Robert Higgs . . . explains that “what the Indians owned was not
simply a claim on certain quantities of fish. Rather, the Indians’ property
rights ensured them the opportunity to take the salmon normally re-
turning—that is, returning without human interception.” Other people
could not rob the fish by catching them before they arrived at established
fishing sites. . . . Families and individuals who had exclusive rights to
certain fishing sites had an incentive to invest time and resources to make
the sites as productive as possible.
Nikel-Zueger, supra note 9, at 5–7 (emphasis in original). R
34. An early source of conflict arose from landowners precluding access to Indians’
usual and accustomed fishing sites through such tactics as fencing, charging access fees,
and threatening physical violence. One account suggested the clashes between Indians and
non-Indians over access to fishing grounds arose out of a fundamental conflict between the
fishing servitude established by the treaties and the unrestricted rights of the holder of land
in fee simple absolute established in federal land grants to white settlers. DUPRIS ET AL.,
supra note 27, at 58–59. Recounting the settlers’ restriction of Indian fishing access, the R
historians wrote:
Thus, by the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Indian fishing
grounds on the Columbia were quickly enclosed by private non-Indian
ownership. Co-ownership became a myth. Indian access to usual and ac-
customed fishing locations became a fictional and distorted thing. In hun-
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The first significant decision was from the Washington Territorial
Court in 1887, which, relying heavily on property law principles, ruled
that landowners could not preclude tribal members’ access to historic
fishing grounds.35 Nonetheless, contrary to the ruling, landowners con-
dreds of confrontations, the Indians met land owners who hadn’t heard of
the fishing “servitude” or who didn’t believe in it; who knew for sure that
access was not here but over there; who let the gates down for only a
small and reasonable fee; who insisted the fishery was a private one; who
advised that discards or eels from the fish wheels or fish-heads from the
cannery were preferable fare to fish freshly caught. The Indians encoun-
tered the fences and road closures and padlocks and abutments and signs
and guards and dogs and firearms that were among the law-sanctioned
“pleasures” of all fee-simple property owners. Thus, the “supreme law of
the land” [i.e., the treaty right to fish in common with white landowners]
was thrashed thoroughly by the common law of property possession.
Id. See also Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 436 (describing early conflicts). R
35. The first case to challenge the fencing practice was United States v. Taylor, 13 P. 333,
335 (Wash. Terr. 1887). On behalf of R.H. Milroy, a federal Indian agent, and the Yakama
Tribe, the United States filed suit against Frank Taylor, a farmer who had enclosed his land
in order to protect crops from trampling during the Indian’s yearly seasonal fishing en-
campment. Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 27, at 517–19; Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at R
436. Historically, Yakama tribal members used Taylor’s newly acquired land in order to get
to and from the Tumwater, the fishing grounds at Celilo Falls on the Columbia River. Tay-
lor, 13 P. at 334. They also fished from the shore, cured fish, erected temporary dwellings,
and allowed their ponies to graze on what became the Taylor homestead. Id. The Yakama
Nation’s treaty with the United States, in conformity with the other Stevens treaties, re-
served to the tribe the “right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common
with the citizens of the Territory, and of erecting temporary buildings for curing them.”
Treaty with the Yakamas, art. III, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951. At the same time, Taylor’s
patent from the federal government contained no mention of the federal treaty right.
Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 27, at 518–19; Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 436. On R
behalf of the tribe, the federal government argued that the Indians reserved the right to fish
in their usual manner at their usual and accustomed grounds, while Taylor maintained that
the right was a grant from the federal government ensuring only that the Indians had
fishing opportunities equal to those of the whites. Taylor, 13 P. at 334. In 1887, the Washing-
ton Territorial Supreme Court held that Taylor and other settlers could not impinge on the
access of tribal fishermen to their usual and accustomed fishing grounds. Id. at 335. First,
the Territorial Court relied on the familiar canon of construction in Indian law that “a
treaty . . . is to be liberally construed in favor of the Indians; and that . . . construction
be adopted which will best subserve the object which the Indians, at the time the treaty was
made, would have been most likely to have desired and understood.” Id. See also Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (foundational case for interpretation of treaties made between
U.S. government and Indian tribes).
The Taylor court sided with the tribe, explaining that the language of the treaty
suggested a reserved right because it concerned “certain ancient fisheries which had for
generations been used . . . [by members] who had certain well-defined habits and meth-
ods connected with such use.” Taylor, 13 P. at 334. The court indicated that a settler took a
patent to federal land “subject to” any “easement or servitude impressed upon it,” and that
the treaty fishing right constituted such a servitude. Id. at 335. This decision marked the
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tinued to exclude tribal fishers from the Columbia Basin. Nearly a dec-
ade after the territorial court’s decision, in the mid-1890s, Indian agents
convinced the government to file a test case involving access to the most
important Indian fishing ground,36 Celilo Falls, on the lower Columbia.37
The federal district court, after issuing a preliminary injunction against
white fencing and then sitting on the issue for some seven years,38 finally
decided that the tribes’ treaty rights entitled them only to equal treat-
ment with whites.39 Since white fishers could be fenced out by landown-
ers, so could tribal fishers.40
Nearly a decade after the case was originally filed, the Supreme
Court reversed in United States v. Winans.41 Justice Joseph McKenna ob-
served, in a memorable, poetic, and enduring decision rooted in first
first interpretation of the treaty fishing right language, and it employed reasoning later
adopted by the Supreme Court in a seminal case on Indian access to fisheries. See Blumm &
Swift, supra note 9, at 436–37 (indicating the Supreme Court relied on the same language in R
United States v. Winans).
At core, United States v. Taylor was a property rights decision. One of us
once wrote:
The servitude imposed a duty on Taylor to manage his land in such a way
as to preserve the Indians access to their historic fisheries. . . . The Taylor
court relied on property law fundamentals to deny a farmer the right to
exclude the tribes from access to the resource by fencing his property. The
same principles should mean a fee owner cannot deny access by dewater-
ing streams for irrigation purposes or polluting streams by pesticide and
sediment runoff.
Id. at 438. These basic property principles continue to shape the contours of the treaty right
to habitat protection, as discussed infra in Parts III and IV.
36. On the role of Indian agents in Winans and its predecessor cases, see Blumm &
Brunberg, supra note 27, at 511–18, 522–24. The test case involved the obstructionist activi- R
ties of Audubon and Linnaens Winans. The Winans brothers owned a large fish wheel at
Celilo Falls, aggressively excluding tribal access to the lucrative fishery through intimida-
tion, assaults, and destruction of temporary shelters. Id. at 524.
37. Celilo Falls was the heart of tribal fishing in the Pacific Northwest, representing
not just a renowned sustainable fishery but also an important trading place and sacred
ground for the First Salmon Ceremony. See DUPRIS ET AL., supra note 27, at ch. 1. In March R
of 1957, the Army Corps of Engineers closed the gates at Dalles Dam, allowing the falls to
be inundated by the mighty Columbia River. Id. at 18.
38. See Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 27, at 525–28 (describing Judge Hanford’s R
machinations, including dissolving his seven-year old injunction against fencing without
explanation in 1903).
39. United States v. Winans, Memorandum Decision on the Merits, Feb. 23, 1903, dis-
cussed in Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 27, at 528–29. R
40. See id.
41. 198 U.S. 371 (1905). For extensive discussion of the case, see Blumm & Swift, supra
note 9, at 440–45; Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 27, at 532–36. R
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principles of property law and treaty interpretation,42 that the right to
fish at usual and accustomed grounds “was a part of larger rights pos-
sessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a
shadow of impediment, and which were not much less necessary to the
existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.”43 Recogniz-
ing that the tribes had reserved this paramount right to fish,44 McKenna
concluded the reserved “right of taking fish” created “a servitude upon
every piece of land as though described therein.”45 Further, this “right in
the land” burdened not only the federal government that agreed to it, but
also its grantees, like states and private landowners.46 In other words, the
Court concluded that the reserved treaty fishing right was a piscary profit
a` prendre—“the right to go on another’s property and take and remove a
natural resource.”47 This 1905 decision has been the foundation of treaty
fishing rights for over a century.
In the ensuing decades, the Supreme Court continued to protect
the tribes’ piscary profit from physical and economic barriers to access.
Just 13 years after Winans, the treaty fishing rights issue was back before
the Court, which decided that the piscary profit applied to lands that a
tribe did not explicitly cede but which it had used historically.48 A gener-
ation later, in Washington v. Tulee,49 the Court held that the State of Wash-
ington could not charge tribal fishers license fees because the fees were
not indispensable to conservation of the salmon resource.50 Another gen-
eration later, in the Puyallup trilogy of decisions that occupied the
Court’s attention for a decade, the Court began to confront and strike
42. See generally Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 27, at 536–44 (concluding that the Wi- R
nans legacy included: (1) construing treaty language as tribes would understand; (2) laying
the foundation of the reserved rights doctrine; (3) treating treaty rights as property rights;
and (4) rejecting state arguments that the “equal footing” doctrine trumped treaty rights).
43. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
44. Id. (“[T]he treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from
them—a reservation of those not granted.”).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 381–82 (indicating the servitude burdened both “the United States and its
grantees as well as against the State and its grantees”).
47. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 445 n.183–184 (describing common law of R
piscary profits a` prendre and various courts’ description of treaty fishing rights as such). See
infra note 213 (comparing the remedies available to cotenants with those available to profit- R
holders).
48. Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919) (refusing to use technical
legal rules to disadvantage tribal fishers when the rules would produce a result conflicting
with the treaties intention of preserving the tribes ability to fish at their historic sites).
49. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
50. Id. at 684 (concluding that the state license fee had both regulatory and revenue-
generating purposes and that the regulatory purpose could be achieved through less bur-
densome alternatives).
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down discriminatory “conservation” regulation of tribal harvests
promulgated by the Pacific Northwest states.51 The Supreme Court de-
cided that a state could regulate tribal harvests if in the interest of a neu-
tral conservation purpose,52 and neutral conservation measures could
allocate both on-reservation and off-reservation tribal harvests.53 How-
ever, a state ban on net fishing (which the Indians exclusively practiced
on the river in question) was not a neutral conservation measure, since it
saddled all conservation costs on tribal fishers.54
Thus, by 1973, when the Supreme Court handed down its final
Puyallup decision—more than half a century after Winans—the tribes had
won significant judicial victories. The Supreme Court had ruled that the
treaties recognized that the tribes possessed an affirmative easement to
access their traditional fishing grounds regardless of land ownership,55
determined that this right burdened lands not expressly granted in a
treaty if the tribe historically used those lands,56 announced that the State
could not charge fees for the exercise of the treaty fishing right,57 and
decided that while the State could regulate the exercise of the tribal right
51. By the mid-twentieth century, the states had imposed strict conservation regula-
tions and harvest restrictions, reflective of the fact that the rivers were producing salmon
populations at a tiny fraction of their historic levels. Although the salmon runs were al-
ready severely depleted, the salmon population plummeted after construction of the Dalles
Dam, which forever inundated the sacred Celilo Falls. See ROBERTA ULRICH, EMPTY NETS:
INDIANS, DAMS, AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER 116 (1999) (describing depleted fish runs and
resulting regulation).
52. PUYALLUP TRIBE V. DEP’T. OF GAME OF WASHINGTON (Puyallup I), 391 U.S. 392, 398
(1968) (ruling, in confusing fashion, that the treaty fishing right “may, of course, not be
qualified by the state,” but that “the manner of fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of
commercial fishing, and the like may be regulated by the state in the interest of conserva-
tion, provided the regulation . . . does not discriminate against the Indians”). Professor
Ralph Johnson perceptively warned that this decision gave the state more discretion than it
could use in a nondiscriminatory fashion. See Ralph W. Johnson, The States Versus Indian
Off-Reservation Fishing: A United States Supreme Court Error, 47 WASH. L. REV. 207, 232–35
(1972).
53. PUYALLUP TRIBE, INC. V. DEP’T OF GAME OF STATE OF WASHINGTON (Puyallup III), 433
U.S. 165, 176–77 (1977) (upholding the allocation, which state courts had approved, even
though between Puyallup II and Puyallup III the Ninth Circuit held that the fishing site in
question was an on-reservation site, not an off-reservation site, as the state court had as-
sumed in Dep’t of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 496 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1974)). On the Puyallup
trilogy, see Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 449–53. R
54. DEP’T OF GAME OF WASH. V. PUYALLUP TRIBE (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 44, 48 (1973)
(“There is discrimination here because all Indian net fishing is barred and only hook-and-
line fishing, entirely pre-empted by non-Indians, is allowed.”).
55. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
56. Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 198–99 (1919).
57. Washington v. Tulee, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942).
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for fish conservation purposes,58 the State could not single out the tribes
for an unfair portion of that conservation burden.59 Although the final
decision in the Puyallup trilogy rejected an exclusive on-reservation tribal
salmon fishery,60 whether the treaties entitled the tribes to a harvest
share remained unclear. Fortunately, a case was already underway that
would resolve this question.
II. THE BELLONI AND BOLDT DECISIONS: RECOGNIZING A
MEANINGFUL TRIBAL HARVEST SHARE
At first, treaty rights claims appeared in court as defenses to state
criminal prosecutions enforcing alleged conservation regulations.61 But,
in 1968, 14 members of the Yakama Nation broke this pattern by filing
suit against the State of Oregon’s fish agencies, claiming that the State’s
conservation regulations interfered with their treaty-protected “right of
taking fish.”62 The State argued that it need not give separate recognition
or protection to the treaty right in its conservation regulations, and that
those regulations could restrict treaty fishing so long as they did not dis-
58. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t. of Game of Washington (Puyallup I), 391 U.S. 392, 398
(1968).
59. Dep’t of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 44, 48 (1973).
60. PUYALLUP TRIBE, INC. V. DEP’T OF GAME OF STATE OF WASHINGTON (Puyallup III), 433
U.S. 165, 176–77 (1977).
61. See, e.g., Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942) (holding that the State of
Washington could not charge Yakama tribal member a fee for fishing); Makah Tribe v.
Schoettler, 192 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1951) (holding that the state failed to demonstrate
conservation necessity); Maison v. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation, 314
F.2d 169, 173–74 (9th Cir. 1963) (overturning a state ban designed to protect non-Indian
fisheries). See Johnson, supra note 52, at 209–10. Some Indians and historians have charged R
that the states imposed and enforced harvest regulations much more strictly against Indi-
ans than whites. See, e.g., ULRICH, supra note 51, at 118–22 (describing stringent regulation R
of Indian harvest and arrests). See also Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 435 n.135, 452–453 R
n.218 (describing a series of decisions in which the Washington state courts upheld earlier
regulations limiting tribal harvests).
62. See Sohappy v. Smith (Belloni Decision), 302 F. Supp. 899, 903 (D.Or. 1969). Under
the influence of Assistant Regional Solicitor of the Department of the Interior George Dy-
sart, the federal government filed a separate suit on behalf of itself and several tribes, cap-
tioned United States v. Oregon, which was consolidated with the tribal suit for trial. See id. at
904; Charles F. Wilkinson, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF
THE WEST 204–205 (1992). Today, 40 years later, the federal district court of Oregon retains
jurisdiction over United States v. Oregon, one of the longest running federal cases in history.
See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, No. 68-513-KI, 2008 WL 1711525, at *1 (D.Or. April 8,
2008) (representing most recent case under continuing jurisdiction); Fronda Woods, Who’s
in Charge of Fishing?, 106 OR. HIST. Q. 412, ¶ 52 (2005).
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criminate against tribal fishers.63 Judge Robert Belloni sided with the
tribes, stating that the State’s equal protection argument “would not
seem unreasonable if all history, anthropology, biology, prior case law,
and the intention of the parties were to be disregarded.”64
Instead, Judge Belloni ruled that the treaty fishing right ensured a
right to a “fair share” of the fish harvest for tribal fishers.65 He subse-
quently ordered the State to recognize the federal rights of the tribes as a
fishery distinct from the non-Indian fishery66 and required the State to
protect the treaty fishing as a “regulatory policy co-equal with the con-
servation of fish runs for other users.”67 The Belloni Decision, as the case
came to be called, revolutionized salmon management in the Columbia
Basin, eventually resulting in a negotiated comprehensive management
plan, which the court oversaw.68 Following the decision, Judge Belloni
63. See Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 907 (“There is no support . . . [in the case law] for any
such narrow interpretation of the state’s authority to distinguish between the regulation of
Indian treaty-protected fishing and that of fishing by others.”).
64. Id. at 905.
65. Id. at 911. Judge Belloni interpreted [Puyallup I] “to mean that the state cannot so
manage the fishery that little or no harvestable portion of the run remains to reach the
upper portions of the stream where the historic Indian places are mostly located.” Id. Not-
withstanding his articulation of the “fair share” principle, Judge Belloni did not define what
an equitable allocation might be. This question would be answered by a different judge in a
ground-breaking opinion that would become one of the most contentious in Pacific North-
west history. See infra notes 86–91 and accompanying text (describing strife between Indian R
and non-Indian fisherman in the wake of the Boldt Decision).
66. Id. at 912. See also id. at 910–11 (“Oregon recognizes sports fishermen and commer-
cial fishermen and seems to attempt to make an equitable division between the two . . . .
If Oregon intends to maintain a separate status of commercial and sports fisheries, it is
obvious a third must be added, the Indian fishery.”). In addition, Judge Belloni held that
when the State undertook to regulate the treaty-protected “right of taking fish at all usual
and accustomed places,” it did not have “the same latitude in prescribing the management
objectives and the regulatory means of achieving them” as when regulating a non-Indian
fishery. Id. at 908. Instead, the State could use its regulatory authority “only to the extent
necessary to prevent the exercise of [the treaty fishing] right in a manner that will imperil
the continued existence of the fish resource.” Id. Judge Belloni’s articulation of the state
agencies’ authority is characteristic of the lack of judicial deference to agency authority in
cases alleging treaty rights violations.
67. Id. at 911.
68. See Penny H. Harrison, The Evolution of a New Comprehensive Plan for Managing
Columbia River Anadromous Fish, 16 ENVTL. L. 705 (1986); Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at R
454 (discussing the manner in which Sohappy changed salmon management). In an inter-
view with an oral historian from the Oregon Historical Society, Judge Belloni described his
decision to retain continuing jurisdiction over the case and the 12-year span in which he
supervised allocation decisions on the Columbia River. Judge Belloni noted:
I . . . required the parties to get together and come up with a plan to
which they could all agree. . . . [A]fter I decided the case I realized that it
wouldn’t operate by itself. Someone in authority had to see that it was
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also established standards for the State to follow in achieving the “co-
equal” status of the tribal fishery, including requiring “meaningful” tri-
bal participation in the development of harvest regulations and ensuring
that the regulations were “the least restrictive regulations” consistent
with ensuring conservation of the salmon.69
The year after the Belloni Decision,70 as tribal members continued
to be arrested, especially in Washington,71 the federal government and
numerous tribes in western Washington filed suit in federal court in
Washington, asking for an allocated share of Puget Sound Basin
salmon.72 Actually, the plaintiffs sought three remedies: (1) a harvest
share, (2) inclusion of hatchery fish in that harvest share, and (3) recogni-
tion that the treaty protected the fish at the center of the treaty from
enforced, implemented, changed, if need be so I took continuing jurisdic-
tion of the case. The case didn’t end with my ruling. Whenever disputes
arose under the system, they’d come to me after filing the proper papers
and have it decided. I operated in that capacity for twelve years, I was
more or less fishmaster of the Columbia River for that length of time.
Interview by James Strassmaier, Oregon Historical Society, with Judge Belloni (May
31, 1989), available at http://www.ohs.org/education/oregonhistory/search/index.cfm
(search “Judge Belloni”). [hereinafter Belloni Oral History].
69. Sohappy v. Smith, No. 68-409, slip op. at 2–3 (D.Or. Oct. 10, 1969) (unpublished
judgment). See Timothy Weaver, Litigation and Negotiation: The History of Salmon in the Co-
lumbia River Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 677, 680–81 (1997) (reprinting a portion of Judge Bel-
loni’s unpublished judgment).
70. Initially, Oregon did not appeal Sohappy, but when the judge adopted the equal
sharing formula from the Boldt Decision and its appeal, United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d
676 (9th Cir. 1975), for the spring chinook run, the State eventually appealed to the Ninth
Circuit, which affirmed. Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1976).
71. During the summer of 1970, activists conducted armed “fish-ins” on the Puyallup
River. Federal agents raided a “fish-in” encampment only weeks before the filing of United
States v. Washington. See ULRICH, supra note 51, at 133 (indicating “[d]iscrimination against R
treaty Indian fishing . . . actually increased” immediately after Sohappy); Woods, supra
note 62, at ¶ 54. R
72. United States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974),
aff’d sub nom. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658,
669 (1979).
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habitat destruction.73 Judge George Boldt74 deferred acting on the latter
two requests until settling the first.75
After nearly four years of proceedings,76 Judge Boldt issued a de-
cision on February 12, 1974, that invalidated Washington’s harvest regu-
lations as discriminating against tribal fishing.77 In this historic and
lengthy decision, Judge Boldt determined the state regulations restricted
and sometimes prohibited tribal fishing at historic fishing grounds while
“permitting [non-Indian] fishing for salmon elsewhere on the same runs
of fish.”78 Moreover, despite the State’s claims of Indian overharvests,
during more than three years of taking evidence, Judge Boldt found that
the State failed to produce “any credible evidence showing any instance,
remote or recent, when a definitively identified member of any plaintiff
tribe exercised his off-reservation treaty rights by any conduct or means
detrimental to the perpetuation of any species of anadromous fish.”79 In
fact, at the time of trial the tribes harvested just 2 percent of the total
harvest.80 In short, the State was hardly discriminating against tribal har-
vests in the interest of conservation of fish. Instead, it was discriminating
against the tribes to conserve fish for competing non-Indian harvesters.81
73. See id. at 328. See also SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 80. R
74. Judge Boldt, who was a named partner in both a Seattle and a Tacoma law firm
from 1928 until 1953 and also served as a state Assistant Attorney General in 1940 and
1950, was appointed to the federal bench in 1953 by President Eisenhower, becoming Chief
Judge of the Western District of Washington in 1971. Biographical Note: Guide to Papers of
George H. Boldt, 1971-73, George H. Boldt Papers, Archives and Special Collections, Mau-
reen and Mike Mansfield Library, The University of Montana-Missoula, http://nwda-db.
wsulibs.wsu.edu/findaid/ark:/80444/xv35913 (last visited Jan. 27, 2009). Judge Boldt re-
tired in 1979 and died on March 18, 1984. See Woods, supra note 62, at ¶ 80; Paul Shukov- R
sky, Alzheimer’s Strikes Indians Through Judge Boldt Had Disease When He Issued Ruling,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 11, 1992, at A1, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.
com/archives/1992/9206110030.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2009) (describing Judge Boldt’s
battle with Alzheimer’s beginning in 1979).
75. See United States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), 384 F. Supp. 312, 328 (W.D. Wash.
1974) (noting the court would decide at a later time “claims for relief concerning alleged
destruction or impairment of treaty right fishing due to state authorization of, or failure to
prevent, logging and other industrial pollution and obstruction of treaty right fishing
streams”).
76. After three-and-a-half years of pre-trial proceedings, Judge Boldt conducted a
three-week trial, with 49 witnesses and hundreds of documents admitted. Woods, supra
note 62, at ¶¶ 54–59. R
77. Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 403–404.
78. Id. at 393.
79. Id. at 338 n.26.
80. See Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n (Pas-
senger Fishing Vessel), 443 U.S. 658, 676–77 n.22 (1979) (citing United States v. Washington, 459
F. Supp. 1020, 1032 (W.D. Wash. 1978)).
81. As accurately predicted by Professor Johnson, supra note 52, at 208–09. R
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Since the available salmon were insufficient to supply both Indian
and non-Indian needs, like Judge Belloni before him, Judge Boldt de-
cided that the treaties required a fair allocation of harvests.82 Judge Boldt,
however, broke new ground by quantifying what that fair allocation
should be.83 He construed the treaty language “in common with” to
mean “by dictionary definition and as intended and used in
the . . . treaties[,] . . . sharing equally the opportunity to take fish.”84
Consequently, he directed the State to limit the non-Indian share to 50
percent of the total harvest.85 This directive altered salmon harvests dra-
matically and, by 1977, the tribes were harvesting 43 percent of Puget
Sound harvests.86
But change did not come without widespread resistance. The
Boldt Decision provoked a wave of public outrage and dissidence unlike
any the region had seen before, prompting the Ninth Circuit later to
82. United States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash.
1974).
83. See Brian E. Schartz, Fishing for a Rule in a Sea of Standards: A Theoretical Justification
for the Boldt Decision, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 314, 332 (2007) (“[N]o prior decision had gone
so far as to derive a clear, bright-line rule from the Stevens treaties.”). Judge Belloni viewed
the 50 percent formula articulated by Judge Boldt as an improvement:
In his opinion [Judge Boldt] followed mine exactly. In fact, he quoted ver-
batim I think about five pages of my opinion in his. He made one change
which I thought was a good one. . . . Judge Boldt clarified [the fair and
equitable share concept] and he said that fair and equitable share will be
50% of the fish.
Belloni Oral History, supra note 68. R
84. Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 343.
85. Id. Judge Boldt excluded from the equal sharing formula (1) fish harvested by
tribes on-reservation, (2) fish not destined to pass the tribe’s historic fishing grounds, and
(3) fish caught outside Washington waters. See Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 687–89.
86. See Brief of Respondent Indian Tribes, at 59; Washington v. Wash. State Commer-
cial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n (Passenger Fishing Vessel), 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (Nos. 77-
983, 78-119, and 78-139), 1979 WL 199417. However, given the exclusions in Judge Boldt’s,
see supra note 85, formula the tribes actually harvested only 18 percent of the total Wash- R
ington harvest in 1977. Brief of Respondent Indian Tribes, supra, at 59. Notwithstanding the
definitive answer to the apportionment question, the habitat degradation question re-
mained unanswered. United States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), 384 F. Supp. at 328. In
part due to this deferral and his correct assumption that additional issues would arise from
the allocation decision, Judge Boldt retained continuing jurisdiction “without limitation.”
Id. at 347. See Woods, supra note 62, at ¶ 65. Over the next three decades, the tribes would R
seek redress on several more issues in the sub-proceedings of United States v. Washington,
including the claimed right to habitat protection. See infra Parts III, V. Additionally, Judge
Boldt’s 50 percent rule begged the question as to whether hatchery fish should be included
in the 50 percent allocation. United States v. Washington (Orrick Decision), 506 F. Supp. 187,
198–99 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985).
Judge Orrick, the successor to the United States v. Washington sub-proceedings answered
this question in the affirmative. Id. at 202.
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compare the resistance to that of the Southern states’ defiance of school
desegregation orders.87 Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Boldt
in 1975,88 non-Indian harvesters engaged in widespread noncompliance
with the federal court’s orders.89 The non-Indian harvesters also
mounted a legal assault on Judge Boldt’s decision in Washington’s state
court, and they succeeded in collaterally attacking the decision when the
state supreme court ruled that the State lacked authority under state stat-
utes and the state constitution to implement the equal-sharing formula.90
Consequently, from 1977 to 1979, Judge Boldt managed the Puget Sound
and coastal Washington fisheries himself, enforced via court orders,
criminal contempt citations, and federal marshals.91 In short, he became a
judicial fishmaster.92
The conflict between state and federal courts induced a reluctant
U.S. Supreme Court to wade into the morass of the Northwest salmon
wars for the fourth time in little over a decade. In 1979, the Court, in a 6-
87. See Puget Sound Gillnetters v. U.S. District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir.
1978) (“Except for some desegregation cases the district court has faced the most concerted
official and private efforts to frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed in this cen-
tury.”) (citation omitted); Schartz, supra note 83, at 332–33 (describing public outcry regard- R
ing the 50 percent rule and attributing the sentiment to the fact that Judge Boldt set out a
bright-line rule arising from the Stevens treaties for the first time in their history); Woods,
supra note 62, at ¶ 66. R
88. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086
(1976).
89. SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 81 (noting non-compliance and shooting R
threats). By the time Judge Boldt issued his opinion, harvest levels were already reduced
due to seriously depleted salmon populations. Nikel-Zueger, supra note 9, at 14–15. Judge R
Boldt’s 50 percent rule essentially reduced the harvest quota by half for non-Indian fisher-
man because the Indian take prior to the ruling made up only about 2 percent of the total
harvest. Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 676–77 n.22 (1979). Just three years after the
Boldt Decision, the Indian harvest reached 43 percent of Puget Sound’s total harvest (and
about 18 percent of Washington’s total harvest). See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, R
at 81. As a result, Washingtonians viciously hung Judge Boldt in effigy, sported bumper
stickers urging citizens to “Can Judge Boldt—Not Salmon,” and gathered 80,000 signatures
supporting his impeachment. See Schartz, supra note 83, at 332. R
90. Wash. State Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass’n v. Tollefson, 571 P.2d 1373 (Wash.
1977), vacated, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. Moos, 565 P.2d 1151
(Wash. 1977), vacated, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). See also SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at R
81.
91. See Woods, supra note 62, at ¶ 77. R
92. In doing so, he became a cautionary example for other federal judges who balked
at providing close judicial oversight of agencies managing other natural resources. See, e.g.,
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1062–63 (D. Nev. 1985) (in which
Judge Burns declined to assume the role of “rangemaster” of federal grazing lands in west-
ern Nevada). See infra note 273. R
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3 decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, affirmed Judge Boldt.93
The Court employed a canon of treaty construction—that treaty terms
should be interpreted as the tribes would understand them94—to uphold
the equal sharing principle.95 Justice Stevens also observed the treaty
right prevented tribal harvesters from being “crowded out” of their fish-
ery; thus, neither party could harvest the other’s share of the resource.96
According to the Court,
[t]he logic of the 50% ceiling is manifest. For an equal divi-
sion—especially between parties who presumptively treated
each other as equals—is suggested, if not necessarily dictated,
by the word ‘common’ as it appears in the treaties. Since the
days of Solomon, such a division has been accepted as a fair
apportionment of a common asset, and Anglo-American com-
mon law has presumed that division when, as here, no other
percentage is suggested by the language of the agreement or
the surrounding circumstances.97
Judge Boldt’s equal sharing principle, therefore, withstood Supreme
Court scrutiny.98
An enduring aspect of the Court’s affirmance was its adoption of
a needs-based “moderate living” standard as a measure of the scope of
the treaty right of taking fish. Clarifying that it meant the equal sharing
principle to operate as a ceiling, the Court proclaimed that “the central
principle here must be that Indian treaty rights to a natural resource that
was once thoroughly and exclusively exploited by the Indians secures so
much as, but not more than, is necessary to provide the Indians with a
livelihood—that is to say, a moderate living.”99 Thus, under the “moder-
ate living” standard, the tribal harvest share could be judicially reduced
93. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658 (1979).
94. Id. at 676 (“[T]he treaty must therefore be construed not according to the technical
meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be
understood by the Indians.”).
95. In addition to tribes’ likely understanding of the treaty language, the Court af-
firmed the equal sharing formula by looking to contemporaneous usages of the word
“common” and interpretation of treaties with Great Britain giving each nation an equal
harvest share. Id. at n.23.
96. Id. at 676.
97. Id. at 687 n.27.
98. The Court did adjust the equal sharing formula in two ways: (1) it included on-
reservation harvests as well as ceremonial and subsistence harvest in the 50 percent tribal
share; and (2) it included in the non-tribal 50 percent only fish harvested by Washington
citizens in state or federal waters. Id. at 688–89.
99. Id. at 686. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 458 n.246 (discussing criticism and
applications of the moderate living standard).
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below 50 percent if a tribe: (1) dwindled “to just a few members” or (2)
found “other sources of support that lead it to abandon its fisheries.”100 In
almost 30 years since the Court’s decision, no evidence of either of these
qualifications has appeared. With the moderate living qualification, the
Supreme Court concluded the equitable apportionment era of litigation
surrounding the treaty fishing right. The final frontier of litigation would
involve an attempt to expand the number of salmon subject to
apportionment.
III. THE HABITAT RIGHT FROM 1970–2007: A LONG AND
WINDING ROAD
By the time Judge Boldt issued his groundbreaking opinion, the
salmon and steelhead fisheries had faced over a century of decline,
which made the allocation issue extraordinarily contentious.101 As a re-
sult, the next sub-proceeding of United States v. Washington (commonly
referred to as “Phase II”) involved tribal efforts to expand the “pie” to be
allocated.102
In 1970, when the tribes filed suit in Judge Boldt’s court, they not
only sought a share of the salmon harvests, but they also sought the in-
clusion of hatchery fish in their harvest share and a declaration that the
“right of taking fish” included protection of the habitat that allowed the
fish to exist.103 Judge Boldt resolved the harvest share question, but left
the latter two issues unresolved.104 By the time the Supreme Court de-
100. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658, 687 (1979). Justice Thurgood Marshall’s papers revealed that the insertion of the “mod-
erate living” standard into the opinion was a result of an effort by Justice Stevens to pre-
serve a precarious majority. The three-member dissent, written by Justice Powell, worried
that equal sharing would produce “an extraordinary economic windfall to Indian fisher-
men. . . . ” Id. at 705–06 (Powell, J., dissenting). The moderate living language, as a ceiling
on the tribal share, was a successful effort on the part of Justice Stevens to keep from losing
his majority. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of
the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1637–39 (1996) (noting that Stevens
thought that a 50 percent harvest share would yield only about 20 percent for tribal har-
vests, assuming—erroneously, it turned out—that the tribes would be unable to success-
fully argue that their treaty rights included harvests of hatchery fish). For the hatchery fish
litigation, see supra note 14, infra notes 108–109 and accompanying text. R
101. See supra notes 82–91 and accompanying text. R
102. See Lewis, supra note 31, at 297 (“The problem for Indians today is not their piece of R
the pie, it is the size of the pie. To address the size of the pie, some courts have considered
the proposed habitat right.”).
103. See supra notes 73 and 75 and accompanying text. R
104. United States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), 384 F. Supp. 312, 328 (W.D. Wash.
1974), aff’d sub nom. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 669 (1979).
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cided that the treaties did indeed guarantee the tribes a harvest share in
1979,105 Judge Boldt had retired and Judge William Orrick had replaced
him on the case.106
Taking a common sense approach to the two issues left un-
resolved by Judge Boldt, Judge Orrick had little difficulty ruling, in 1980,
that hatchery fish were included in the tribal harvestable share, and that
the treaties protected fish habitat.107 The State had argued that hatchery
fish should be excluded from the equal sharing formula, encouraged by
the Supreme Court concurrence in Puyallup II.108 The State’s arguments
notwithstanding, Judge Orrick ruled that the hatchery fish were included
in the equal sharing formula because hatcheries were the State’s (and
federal government’s) overwhelming choice for mitigation of the ad-
verse effects of aquatic developments, particularly dam construction and
operation, on salmon.109
Concerning the habitat issue, Judge Orrick also ruled in favor of
the tribes, concluding that the “right of taking” fish implied a right to
protect the habitat necessary to sustain the salmon runs.110 He did so on
the ground that “[t]he most fundamental prerequisite to exercising the
right to take fish is the existence of fish to be taken.”111 Orrick determined
that the Supreme Court had found that the primary purpose of the trea-
105. See supra notes 93–100 and accompanying text. R
106. See supra note 74 for biographical information on Judge Boldt. Judge Orrick, of the R
Northern District of California, joined his father’s San Francisco law firm before serving in
President John F. Kennedy’s Justice Department. Larken Bradley, Judge William Orrick, 87,
A Stinson Beach Pundit (obituary), POINT REYES LIGHT, Sept. 18, 2003, available at http://
www.ptreyeslight.com/stories/sept18_03/orrick_obit.html. President Richard Nixon ap-
pointed him to the federal bench in 1974. Id. When no members of the Western District of
Washington wanted the notoriety that United States v. Washington had brought Judge Boldt,
Judge Orrick was assigned the case. See Lewis, supra note 31, at 296. Judge Orrick died in R
2003 at the age of 87. See Bradley, supra.
107. United States v. Washington (Orrick Decision), 506 F. Supp. 187, 197–98, 208 (W.D.
Wash. 1980), aff’d. in part and vacated in part, 759 F.2d 1353, 1358–60 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
108. In Dep’t of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 44 (1973), the Court
avoided ruling on whether the State could exclude hatchery fish from the equal sharing
formula. Puyallup II, 414 U.S. at 49. A three-member concurrence, written by Justice White
and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, suggested that the equal sharing
formula should not apply to hatchery fish, apparently on the theory that these fish were
“created” by the state’s labor. Id. at 49–50 (White, J., concurring).
109. Orrick Decision, 506 F. Supp. at 198–99. Judge Orrick concluded that hatchery fish
were subject to the treaties because (1) the treaties reserved to the tribes “more than a share
of the [treaty-time] harvests; they also reserved a right to all future runs;” (2) the state
didn’t own the hatchery fish once released to state waters; and (3) the state supplied “only
a portion of the hatchery fish,” as federal, tribal, private, and cooperative hatcheries ac-
counted for nearly half of the hatchery fish. Id. at 200–02.
110. Id. at 203.
111. Id.
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ties was to reserve fish in order to preserve an economic and cultural
way of life.112 Moreover, the treaty negotiators “specifically assured the
tribes that they could continue to fish notwithstanding the changes the
impending westward expansion would certainly entail.”113 Since mainte-
nance of fish habitat was a prerequisite to the survival of the salmon, he
concluded that the treaties must be interpreted to protect that habitat for
the reserved right of taking fish to have any value.114
Judge Orrick also observed that, given the compromised state of
salmonid habitat, Washington could not degrade or allow activities that
degrade habitat because they would impeded the tribes’ ability to make
a “moderate living” through fishing. 115 Otherwise, the treaty right
“would eventually be reduced to the right to dip one’s net into the water
and bring it out empty,” rendering the efforts to establish the proper har-
vest allocation “nugatory.”116 In other words, if the fish went extinct, the
right to take half of the harvest would become “meaningless and value-
less.”117 The opinion marked a major advance for the tribes, but its effects
would not be long-lasting.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the Orrick Decision on three separate
occasions. Initially, in 1983, a three-judge panel upheld, but significantly
modified, Judge Orrick’s finding of an implied habitat right.118 Whereas
Judge Orrick required the State to avoid habitat degradation that would
interfere with the tribes’ right to a “moderate living,” the panel replaced
the standard with a reasonableness test, rejecting what the appellate
court characterized as an “environmental servitude with open-ended
112. Id. at 204.
113. Id.
114. United States v. Washington (Orrick Decision), 506 F. Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash.
1980), aff’d. in part and vacated in part, 759 F.2d 1353, 1358–60 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
115. Id. Judge Orrick held that this prohibition also ran against the federal government
and private parties. Id. at 208. Note, however, the plaintiffs agreed to defer the question of
whether the State of Washington had violated that duty and, if so, what the remedy would
be. Id. at 194.
116. Id. at 203 (paraphrasing Justice Stevens’ statement in Washington v. Wash. State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979), that the treaty right entailed
more than “merely the chance . . . occasionally to dip their nets into the territorial
waters”).
117. Id. at 205.
118. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1983). This panel and each of
the later en banc panels affirmed Judge Orrick’s decision that the State should include
hatchery fish in the number to be allocated between Indians and non-Indians. Id. at 1380.
With regard to Judge Orrick’s articulation of the habitat protection right, however, the
three-judge panel lodged four primary objections: “[T]he absence of a basis in precedent,
the lack of theoretical or practical necessity for the right, its unworkably complex standard
of liability, and its potential for disproportionately disrupting essential economic develop-
ment.” Id. at 1381.
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and unforeseeable consequences.”119 Instead, the panel majority, in an
opinion by Judge Joseph Sneed, held that both the State and the tribes
had to “take reasonable steps commensurate with their respective re-
sources and abilities to preserve and enhance the fishery.”120 Further,
Judge Sneed ruled, without explanation, that the treaty obligations did
not run to private parties.121 Judge Reinhart concurred in the majority’s
holding, stating he saw little practical difference between the reasonable-
ness standard and Judge Orrick’s articulation of the treaty right.122 How-
ever, Reinhart minced no words in saying he thought the treaty right
did, in fact, guarantee that the salmon supply would be safeguarded
from severe habitat degradation.123
The tribes petitioned for rehearing, and an en banc panel of the
Ninth Circuit agreed to reevaluate the case.124 At first, the panel ruled
that it did not have jurisdiction to review the case.125 But the fractured en
banc panel later withdrew its earlier opinion, vacated Judge Sneed’s
opinion, and also vacated Judge Orrick’s decision as to the habitat right,
in a per curiam opinion.126 The court noted that declaratory relief should
be reserved for cases amenable to “[p]recise resolution, not general ad-
monition.”127 According to the plurality, as a matter of judicial prudence,
Judge Orrick should not have ruled on the environmental degradation
issue without the benefit of a particularized factual dispute: “The legal
standards that will govern the State’s precise obligations and duties
under the treaty with respect to the myriad State actions that may affect
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1381 n.15. See also Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 417 n.43 (noting this hold- R
ing was blatantly inconsistent with the Winans decision).
122. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d at 1390 (Reinhart, J., concurring).
123. Judge Reinhart stated:
If it is inconceivable that the Indians would have agreed to be required to
fish on the same terms as non-Indians, it is far more inconceivable that
they would have allowed the State to permit the fishery to be destroyed
altogether. . . . [T]he treaty guarantees that the Indians’ supply of fish
must be safeguarded against pollution by every reasonable means.
Id. at 1391
124. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 417. R
125. Id. (citing United States v. Washington, No. 81-3111, slip op. 5397 (9th Cir. Dec. 17,
1984) (en banc), vacated, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
126. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert.
denied 474 U.S. 994 (1985) (Phase II). The en banc panel, like the initial Ninth Circuit panel,
affirmed the lower court decision on the hatchery issue, determining that the issue was
sufficiently particularized. Id. at 1357–60 (affirming Judge Orrick’s holding that hatchery
fish must be counted in the tribe’s allocation, but noting the judge improperly concluded
the 50 percent tribal share was a minimum share).
127. Id. at 1357.
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the environment of the treaty area will depend for their definition and articu-
lation upon concrete facts which underlie a dispute in a particular case.”128 De-
spite the vacatur, neither the per curium opinion nor any of the several
concurrences and dissents indicated that any of the judges would reverse
Judge Orrick’s habitat holding on the merits.129 Still, perhaps due to the
uncertain scope of the habitat obligations, the court was unwilling to af-
firm without a concrete factual scenario.130
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to not reach the merits left the tribes,
in the spring of 1985, essentially in the same position regarding the
habitat question as they were immediately after the Boldt Decision in
1974. The tribes declined, however, to accept the Ninth Circuit’s invita-
tion to present more particularized facts for almost two decades, pursu-
ing negotiation and cooperative management options instead.131
Eventually, the tribes recognized that their efforts failed to stem the de-
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. See generally id. Judge Ferguson, joined by Judge Schroeder, thought that the plain-
tiffs’ original complaint—with its request to enjoin eight specific state activities—“would
have presented a justiciable controversy,” but the procedural posture of the case did not
allow the court to affirm because Judge Orrick decided the scope of the habitat right “as a
pure issue of law divorced from any factual context” in a decision on a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Id. at 1360 (Ferguson, J., concurring). In dissent, Judge Nelson, joined by
Judge Skopil, indicated that not only did the majority erroneously conclude a declaratory
judgment was unripe at that juncture, but he would have affirmed Judge Orrick’s decision
on the merits of the environmental degradation issue. Id. at 1362–63, 1365–67 (Nelson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Norris dissented from the majority’s vaca-
tur, but, unlike Judge Nelson, would not reach the merits of the environmental degradation
question because the plurality opinion had not. Id. at 1368 (Norris, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Judge Poole, in dissent, wrote that the Ninth Circuit had no busi-
ness ruling on interlocutory rulings of the trial court until the remaining issues (i.e., the
particular state actions that caused environmental degradation and the remedy) had been
decided by the district court. Id. at 1370–71 (Poole, J., dissenting). See also Blumm & Swift,
supra note 9, at 496 n.449 (indicating no Ninth Circuit judge has ever held the habitat pro- R
tection right did not exist in this or any other case).
130. One of us has suggested that the en banc panel may have vacated Judge Orrick’s
ruling on the right to habitat protection due to erroneous concerns that it implied a “wil-
derness servitude,” which could halt all development in the region and potentially require
a return to 1855 habitat conditions. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 489–92. R
131. See id. at 418 (describing tactics tribes pursued in the interim); SACRIFICING THE
SALMON, supra note 1, at 251–52; Schartz, supra note 83, at 339–41. In the meantime (and R
even before the Orrick Decision), several court opinions seemed to accept an implied habitat
right under the treaties without expressly addressing the question by enjoining certain
habitat damaging activities based on the treaty fishing right. See Blumm & Swift, supra note
9, at 462–81 (describing cases involving dam operations and construction; pipeline, marina R
and fish farm development; and reserved water right adjudications); SACRIFICING THE
SALMON, supra note 1, at 252–63; Lewis, supra note 31, at 298–99 (describing some of the R
same cases); See also infra Part VII.
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cline of the salmon runs, and they turned to the culvert issue as their
factual vehicle for deciding the habitat protection question.132
IV. CULVERTS: CRYSTALLIZING THE RIGHT TO
SALMON HABITAT PROTECTION
Before turning to the Martinez Decision, a brief primer on culverts
and their effects on salmon is in order. Most culverts were built at a time
when few worried that various runs of Pacific salmon would go extinct,
which resulted in culvert designs that failed to take into account fish
migration habits.133 But those times of plentiful salmon populations have
long since passed, and today culverts’ adverse effects on fish passage is
well-known.134
A culvert is a pipe or arch, generally made from metal or concrete,
used to allow water to flow underneath roads and railroad tracks where
they cross waterways.135 Culverts are often a cheaper alternative to
132. See, e.g., Lynda V. Mapes, Another Potential Lightning Boldt, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 17,
2001, available at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20010117
&slug=culverts17m0 (last visited Dec.19, 2008) (noting that in 2001 the tribes were catching
the same amount of fish as in 1974 and quoting Phil Katzen, one of the tribes’ attorneys, as
saying “[t]he tribes have lost everything they gained in the Boldt decision”); Andrew Engel-
son, Tribes Fight to Clear the Roads for Salmon, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, July 2, 2001, available at
http://www.hcn.org/issues/206/10611 (last visited Aug. 21, 2009) (indicating tribes took
500,000 fish in the early 1970s, increased the take to 5 million by the mid-1980s, but de-
creased take to 500,000 fish by 2000 due to declining salmon populations). The tribes
thought that neither additional harvest limitations nor hatchery reforms would help
salmon populations as habitat continued to be degraded or lost—in part due to passage-
blocking culverts. See Billy Frank, Jr., Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, Being Frank:
Culvert Ruling Benefits Salmon Everyone, Sept. 4, 2007, available at http://www.nwifc.org/
2007/09/being-frank-culvert-ruling-benefits-salmon-everyone/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2009)
(“Without good habitat, and access to that habitat, there will be no salmon recovery.”).
133. See Engelson, supra note 132. See also Lynda V. Mapes, Culverts Add Obstacles to R
Salmon, State, Politics, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 24, 2008, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.
com/html/localnews/2004142062_culverts24m.html (noting culverts were “built with only
one thing in mind: getting water down straight pipes, as cheaply as possible. No one was
thinking about getting salmon back up them.”).
134. Mapes, supra note 132. Fish passage is particularly important for anadromous fish R
due to their migratory life cycle. Anadromous fish are born in freshwater streams, grow as
juveniles in freshwater streams, migrate to the ocean to mature, and return to their natal
streams in order to spawn. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RESTORING FISH PASSAGE
THROUGH CULVERTS ON FOREST SERVICE AND BLM LANDS IN OREGON AND WASHINGTON
COULD TAKE DECADES 4 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02136.pdf
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]. Consequently, culverts that block access to freshwater habitat
have “the potential to destroy these populations of wild fish.” FISH PASSAGE TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 9, at 6. R
135. See GAO REPORT, supra note 134. Note that the General Accounting Office changed R
its name in 2004 to the Government Accountability Office. David M. Walker, GAO Answers
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bridges that still allow water to follow its natural course and prevent
road erosion and floods.136 In spite of these benefits, culvert design flaws
have created a serious impediment to anadromous fish access to spawn-
ing and rearing habitat.137
Poorly constructed or maintained culverts impede access to
habitat in several ways.138 First, if a culvert outlet is placed too high
above a stream, it may exceed salmon’s jumping capabilities, preventing
anadromous fish from gaining access to upstream spawning and rearing
freshwater habitat.139 Second, improperly designed culverts may be too
steep, which allows water to flow through them too swiftly for salmon to
fight against the current.140 Third, the depth of water inside culverts may
be too shallow to allow fish passage.141 Finally, culverts can become
blocked with debris or sediment, obstructing access to upstream habitat
and creating turbulence too great for fish to overcome.142 Consequently,
culverts render thousands of miles of prime spawning and rearing
habitat inaccessible to salmonids, and impede other salmon recovery
efforts.143
the Question: What’s in a Name?, ROLL CALL, July 19, 2004, available at http://www.rollcall.
com/issues/50_8/guest/6262-1.html.
136. See Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe Replaces Culvert in Creek, NWIFC NEWS (Northwest
Indian Fisheries Comm’n, Olympia, WA), Fall 2008, at 3, available at http://www.elwha
scienceed.org/files/NWIFC-News.
137. See EVA WILDER & MIKE BARBER, WASH. DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION & WASH. DEP’T
OF FISH & WILDLIFE, WSDOT FISH PASSAGE INVENTORY: PROGRESS PERFORMANCE REPORT 6
(2008), available at http://wsdot.wa.gov/NR/rdonlyres/F9743AD2-B4DB-439E-91C5-B973
CBF17506/0/WSDOTFishPassageRpt08.pdf [hereinafter FISH PASSAGE INVENTORY]. For ex-
ample, many culverts have a hatch at one end that opens with increased precipitation, but
barely opens at normal flows, thereby prohibiting fish passage. Schartz, supra note 83, at R
315 n.2.
138. Salmon survival depends on the salmon’s ability “to migrate to the sea, feed on its
rich food resources, and return to spawn in the clean gravel and oxygen rich waters found
in the state [of Washington’s] 50,000 miles of streams.” FISH PASSAGE TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 9, at 6. For a detailed discussion of effects of culverts on salmonids, see WASH. R
DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, DESIGN OF ROAD CULVERTS FOR FISH PASSAGE MANUAL 9–13
(2003), available at http://wdfw.wa.gov/hab/engineer/cm/culvert_manual_final.pdf
[hereinafter FISH PASSAGE MANUAL].
139. See WASH. DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION, FISH PASSAGE FACTS, http://wsdot.wa.gov/
Environment/Biology/FP/fishpassagefacts.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2008) [hereinafter
FISH PASSAGE FACTS]. This type of culvert is known as a “perched” culvert.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. See also Mapes, supra note 132 (describing culverts’ effects on fish passage). R
143. FISH PASSAGE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 6 (noting that, as of 1997, Wash- R
ington Department of Fish and Wildlife estimated barrier culverts blocked access to more
than 3,000 miles of habitat and that that number should be “viewed as conservative”); See
also FISH PASSAGE INVENTORY, supra note 137, at 9 (noting WSDOT-owned culverts block R
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Washington does not dispute the adverse effects of barrier cul-
verts or the benefits of attending to them, but progress repairing or re-
placing culverts has been slow. In 1997, the state reported that more than
200,000 additional adult salmon would likely return to western Washing-
ton if it fixed its culverts, but indicated in 2001 that it would take up to
100 years to fix the 2,400 state-owned “barrier culverts” using existing
funding sources.144 By June 2008, the state had fixed only 218 barrier
culverts since 1991 (roughly 9 percent), and 48 of those still required “ad-
ditional work to meet current fish passage criteria.”145 The 2008 Washing-
ton Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) and Washington State
Department of Transportation (WSDOT) culvert inventory estimated the
number of state-owned culverts in fish-bearing streams at 3,185.146 Of
these, 1,859 block fish passage, and 1,440 of them are barriers that, if
fixed, would result in “significant habitat gain.”147 According to the state
agencies, “significant habitat gain” means culvert repair will open fish
access to at least an additional 200 meters of upstream habitat.148 The
state prioritizes these culverts for “near-term correction using dedicated
fish passage barrier correction funds.”149 In total, repair or replacement of
these barrier culverts would open more than 3,000 miles of potential
thousands of miles of potential salmonid habitat); FISH PASSAGE MANUAL, supra note 138, at R
13 (“Barriers block the use of the upper watershed, which is often the most productive
spawning habitat, considering channel size, substrate and available rearing habitats. Fish
access to upper portions of the watershed is important; fry produced there then have access
to the entire downstream watershed for rearing.”); Press Release, Northwest Indian Fisher-
ies Comm’n, Questions and Answers Regarding the Tribal Culvert Case (Jan. 16, 2001),
available at http://blogs.nwifc.org/weblog/general/2001/01/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2008).
144. See Engelson, supra note 132 (“Barrier culverts” are those that exist in salmon-bear- R
ing streams and impede fish passage in some way).
145. See FISH PASSAGE INVENTORY, supra note 137, at 5; see also FISH PASSAGE FACTS, supra R
note 139 (noting the fixed 218 barrier culverts opened 486 miles of habitat). R
146. FISH PASSAGE INVENTORY, supra note 137, at 5. R
147. Id.
148. Id. at 6.
149. Id. Washington addresses culverts problems in three ways: (1) every two years,
“the Legislature appropriates funds for stand-alone correction projects to address some of
the highest priority barriers,” which are called “dedicated correction” projects and are part
of the WSDOT Environmental Retrofit Program; (2) in highway safety projects, WSDOT
requires correction of barrier culverts if the project requires a Hydraulic Project Approval
(HPA) and evaluates whether barrier culverts should be corrected if no HPA is required;
and (3) state agencies correct some barrier culverts through routine maintenance. Id. at 9.
See also FISH PASSAGE FACTS, supra note 139 (describing the three-pronged approach to pri- R
oritization and factors used).
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salmonid habitat.150 However, over the 17-year period between 1991 and
2008, the state opened only 486 miles of habitat.151
This sluggish rate of improvement is largely a consequence of the
fact that culvert replacement and repair is extraordinarily expensive.152
Average estimates for culvert corrections vary widely, but range any-
where from $250,000153 to $369,000 per culvert.154 WSDOT reports that it
has spent $46 million on culverts since 1991—$20 million on inventory
efforts and $26 million to correct some 218 culverts.155 Using the latter
figures, the state spent an average $119,266 per culvert repair, which is
the most conservative estimate available.156 Accordingly, the total cost of
fixing the thousands of state-owned culverts is in the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars.157
Due to the prohibitive cost of culvert repairs, when the tribes
broached the topic of the culverts’ effect on the tribal salmon harvest
with the state, the parties made little headway, despite several major at-
150. FISH PASSAGE INVENTORY, supra note 137, at 9. Several years might elapse before R
salmon actually use newly opened habitat even after culvert replacement. Id.
151. FISH PASSAGE FACTS, supra note 139. R
152. See Tribal Brief in Opposition to State’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at 22,
United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No.
70-9213) (“State witnesses concede that past repair funding has been inadequate, that in-
creased funding is conditional on legislative commitment, that repair of all State barrier
culverts may take several decades, and that repairs on State forest lands may not meet the
regulatory deadline of 2016.”) (citations omitted).
153. Mapes, supra note 132; Christopher Schwarzen, Many Culverts Blocking Fish, 5-Year R
Study Finds, SEATTLE TIMES, June 15, 2005, available at http://community.seattletimes.nw
source.com/archive/?date=20050615&slug=culverts15e.
154. Robert McClure, Who Would Be a “Greener” Governor?, SEATTLE POST-INTELLI-
GENCER, Oct. 15, 2008, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/383330_greengov16.
html?source=rss (indicating that, in Governor Christine Gregoire’s first term, the state rem-
edied approximately 70 culverts, at an average cost of $369,000 per culvert).
155. FISH PASSAGE FACTS, supra note 139. Of course, the cost of each culvert depends on R
the design required. Washington state agencies follow Washington Department of Fish and
Wildlife’s Design of Road Culverts for Fish Passage Manual to determine the type of correction
option to use at a particular site that will maximize fish passage. See generally FISH PASSAGE
MANUAL, supra note 138. R
156. Note, however, that 48 of the culverts repaired need further work. See FISH PAS-
SAGE FACTS, supra note 139 (noting the 218 barrier culverts fixed opened 486 miles of R
habitat). Dino Rossi, Washington’s 2008 Republican candidate for governor, seemed to esti-
mate culvert repairs at about $120,000 per culverts based on these numbers. Dino Rossi:
Q&A About the Environment, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 14, 2008, available at http://
seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/383248_rossi14.html. However, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer
reported that the figure was very low in comparison to what the state has actually been
spending on stream crossings ($369,000 per culvert). McClure, supra note 154. R
157. See Lynda V. Mapes, Culvert Ruling Backs Tribes, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 23, 2007,
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003849269_culvert23m.
html.
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tempts to come to an agreement.158 Eventually, the tribes determined
they would need to seek judicial resolution of the issue.159 If the Ninth
Circuit thought a particularized fact scenario was necessary to evaluate
the habitat right, the tribes could not have chosen a more ingenious set of
facts to crystallize the implied right to habitat protection.
Unlike many other threats to salmon, barrier culverts present a
very tangible threat to salmon populations because everything about
them is quantifiable and observable.160 The state owns a known number
of culverts. Of those culverts, a certain percentage is blocked. Due to the
blockages, a quantifiable length of stream miles is unavailable for spawn-
ing and rearing habitat. Because that habitat is unavailable, there is a
calculable amount of fish unavailable for the tribes to harvest in order to
make a moderate living. Moreover, through a variety of reports drafted
by Washington state agencies, the state already had documented the seri-
ous consequences of culverts on salmonid populations and eliminated
considerable uncertainty as to the numbers at issue.161 In short, the tribes
were in a very strong position as they again prepared to establish the
habitat right in court.162
V. THE 2007 MARTINEZ DECISION: REAFFIRMING THE
EXISTENCE OF THE HABITAT RIGHT
On January 17, 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice and 20 tribes
filed suit against the State of Washington seeking a “Request for Deter-
mination” in Phase II, the sub-proceeding to United States v. Washing-
ton.163 Although this request concerned only the state’s treaty obligation
158. See Unplug the Culverts, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 4, 2001, available at http://community.
seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20010304&slug=culverted05 [hereinafter Un-
plug the Culverts] (“Three major attempts to settle this dispute, plus mediation, have failed.
The state is hung up on budgeting particulars, and the tribe wants the state to acknowledge
a treaty right to fix the culverts.”).
159. See id. (editorializing that tribes were forced into court because the state was bent
on proceeding at its own speed).
160. In contrast, the effects of pollution or urbanization on salmon populations, for ex-
ample, are much more difficult to document, and their effects on salmon populations are
not as obvious as a culvert outfall raised six feet above a stream.
161. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 171–74 and accompa- R
nying text.
162. See Unplug the Culverts, supra note 158 (“So everyone lurches back to federal court, R
where many years and many, many thousands of dollars later a judge will ask if the state
bothered to read the Boldt . . . decision. . . .”).
163. United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), No. CV 9213RSM, 2007 WL
2437166, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 2007); Mapes, supra note 132. In addition, Columbia River R
tribes—the Nez Perce Tribe, the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of
Oregon, and the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservations—filed amicus
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to minimize the effects of culverts under state roads on fish passage—a
much narrower issue than the prior lines of cases—observers understood
the significance of the case.164 Lynda Mapes, a longtime reporter on
salmon issues for the Seattle Times, entitled her article on the lawsuit’s
filing “Another Potential Lightning Boldt,” denoting its gravity.165 From
the outset, the case was potentially about much more than culverts166—
the tribes sought to reestablish the right to habitat protection that slipped
through the cracks when the Ninth Circuit vacated Judge Orrick’s
decision.167
This time the plaintiffs brought a case involving the type of partic-
ularized factual scenario the Ninth Circuit seemed to have in mind.168
Not only did the tribes limit the habitat-degrading activity to culverts,
they limited the scope of the lawsuit both by geography and culvert
type. Geographically, the case only pertained to culverts north of the Co-
curiae brief in support of the plaintiff tribes’ motion for summary judgment and in re-
sponse to the State’s cross-motion for summary judgment. See Brief for Nez Perce, Warm
Springs and Umatilla Tribes as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff Tribes, United States v.
Washington (Martinez Decision), No. CV 9213RSM, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash.) (Case
No. 70-9213).
164. See, e.g., Schartz, supra note 83, at 316 (“[W]hen the case was first filed, Curt Smitch, R
then the top salmon aide to the former governor of Washington, publicly characterized the
culvert litigation as ‘Boldt II’ that could prioritize the rights of Indians above non-
Indians.”).
165. Mapes, supra note 132. R
166. See id. (“At its most potent, the case could establish a broader state duty to address
any state-authorized activity that hurts salmon survival, from water use to timber practices
and development.”); Engelson, supra note 132. R
167. In 1980, the plaintiffs asked Judge Orrick to pass first on the legal question of
“whether the tribes’ fishing right include[d] the right to have treaty fish protected from
environmental degradation.” United States v. Washington (Orrick Decision), 506 F. Supp.
187, 202 (W.D. Wash. 1980). They left the questions of whether the State had violated the
treaty fishing right by permitting certain destructive activities, as well as what the remedy
would be if it had, for another day did not come until the twenty-first century. Id. at 194.
168. See United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). See
also supra notes 127–32 and accompanying text; Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Mo-
tion for Partial Summary Judgment, at 3, United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision),
No. CV 9213RSM, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash.) (No. 70-9213) (“This sub-proceeding is
brought in response to the direction of the Ninth Circuit to seek confirmation of the treaty
right in a particular fact context.”). Culverts were not the first concrete factual scenario for
which the tribes sought resolution of the habitat right, but the earlier disputes settled out of
court and are not a matter of public record. Telephone Interview with Peter C. Monson,
Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Oct. 28, 2008) (notes on file with authors). Further, the tribes
engaged in discussions with the state over culvert repair prior to filing the lawsuit, but the
negotiations became deadlocked over a repair timetable and broke down “when the tribes
insisted the state admit it had a treaty-mandated obligation to maintain salmon at harvest-
able levels, not just recover the fish listed under the Endangered Species Act.” Engelson,
supra note 132. R
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lumbia River and west of the Cascade Mountains.169 It also narrowly fo-
cused on “barrier culverts under state roads that affect salmon runs
passing through the tribes’ usual and accustomed fishing areas.”170
The plaintiffs focused on quantifiable figures by concentrating on
the numbers the state described in the 1997 WSDOT and WDFW report,
which indicated numerous culverts under state roads in the case area
needed repair or replacement.171 Two hundred and sixty-eight culverts
blocked significant amounts of habitat, including 249 linear miles of
spawning and rearing habitat upstream of the blockages.172 Thus, “more
than 400,000 square meters of productive spawning habitat, and more
than 1.5 million square meters of productive rearing habitat for juvenile
fish” were cut off.173 The state report concluded “removal of the obstacles
presented by blocked culverts would result in an annual increase of
200,000 fish, many of which would be available for Tribal harvest.”174
In their opening brief, the tribes framed their arguments to under-
score the effect of habitat degradation on the tribes’ ability to achieve the
“moderate living” standard established by Justice Stevens in Passenger
Fishing Vessel.175 The tribes argued that because the State had constructed
and maintained culverts in a manner that degraded fish habitat, adult
fish production had declined, which, in turn, reduced the number of fish
available for the tribal harvest.176 According to the tribes, state actions
that diminished the total number of harvestable fish impermissibly inter-
fered with the tribes’ ability to earn a moderate living from their treaty
169. See Mapes, supra note 157; Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for Partial R
Summary Judgment, supra note 168, at 10 n.3 (indicating that the area roughly conformed R
to the State of Washington’s Northwest and Olympic regions).
170. See Press Release, supra note 143; Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for R
Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 168, at 9–11. R
171. Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra
note 168, at 10. R
172. Id. (indicating that the 1997 report initially identified 268 barrier culverts but, in its
2006 progress report, the state increased the number to 1,136 barrier culverts, which
blocked eight times as many stream miles as originally estimated). These numbers reflected
only the culverts that WSDOT maintained. Id. In addition, the tribes noted a partial inven-
tory by the Washington State Department of Parks and Recreation (WDP) and the Wash-
ington State Department of Natural Resources (DNR) located another 750 barrier culverts
on their lands within the case area. Id. at 10–11.
173. United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), No. CV 9213RSM, 2007 WL
2437166, at *2 (W.D. Wash.) (citing tribes’ Request for Determination).
174. Id.
175. See Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
supra note 168, at 2–5. R
176. Id. at 3–4; United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), 2007 WL 24371166, at
*3.
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fisheries.177 In support, the tribes cited the long line of cases discussed in
Section II of this article.178 Although the tribes noted that the express
treaty fishing right in the Stevens treaties made the existence of an im-
plied habitat right even clearer, they also maintained that the reserved
water rights doctrine (another implied reservation of rights) supported
their position by analogy.179 In addition, the tribes argued that the Ninth
Circuit and other courts had long held that interference with the tribal
fishing right through “degradation of or construction in salmon habitat”
constituted a violation of the treaty fishing right.180 Consequently,
“[s]tate-owned culverts [that] result in the loss of hundreds of miles of
fish habitat that would otherwise produce fish,” violated the Stevens
treaties because, if not for the habitat disturbance, a portion of those fish
177. Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra
note 168, at 4. The federal government framed the right slightly more narrowly, indicating R
the remedy should “focus on those culverts that have more than a de minimis impact on the
fishery.” Brief of United States in Response to Washington’s Summary Judgment Motion
and Amici Counties Memorandum in Support Thereof, at 6, 18, United States v. Washing-
ton (Martinez Decision), No. CV 9213RSM, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash.) (No. 70-9213)
178. Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra
note 168, at 12–17. The tribes’ brief also discussed cases that indirectly examined the habitat R
right. See infra Part VI.
179. Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra
note 168, at 17–19. The tribes relied on three famous Supreme Court cases for the reserved R
rights argument. First, in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the Supreme Court
held that a treaty ceding vast areas of tribal land for white settlement in exchange for a
reservation on which Indians would become self-sustaining farmers impliedly reserved the
water necessary for farming, even though the treaty contained not a word about water. Id.
at 17–18. Second, the Supreme Court ruled in Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248
U.S. 78 (1918), that reservation of the Annette Islands for Alaska Natives to become “civi-
lized” through use of the fisheries resource impliedly reserved the water surrounding the
island, thereby prohibiting non-Indians’ use of fish traps without tribal permission. Id. at
18. Finally, in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), the Supreme Court decided that
reservations of land for tribal use necessarily included an implied right to water from the
Colorado River sufficient to satisfy present and future needs of the animals and crops on
which the tribes depended. Id. at 18–19.
180. Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra
note 168, at 19–22 (citing No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (en- R
joining construction of oil pipeline through Puget Sound region); Umatilla v. Alexander,
440 F. Supp. 553, 555 (D. Or. 1977) (declaring construction of dam was inconsistent with
treaty fishing right); Muckleshoot v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (enjoining
construction of marina); Nw. Sea Farms v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 931 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D.
Wash. 1996) (affirming Corps’ policy of denying in-water development permits where it
would occupy treaty fishing grounds)). For a discussion of these cases, see also infra Part
VI.; Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 462–81; SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at R
252–63; Lewis, supra note 31, at 298–99. R
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would be available for the tribal harvest necessary to make a moderate
living.181
As for relief, the tribes sought a declaratory judgment, a prohibi-
tory injunction, and a mandatory injunction.182 First, they wanted a de-
claratory judgment acknowledging that the treaty fishing right imposed
a duty on the State to refrain from degrading habitat through building
and maintaining passage-blocking culverts, and that the State of Wash-
ington had violated and continued to violate that duty.183 Second, they
requested an injunction prohibiting the State from building or maintain-
ing any culverts that reduced the number of fish passing to or from the
tribes’ usual and accustomed grounds.184 Finally, the plaintiffs asked the
court to require Washington to:
(1) [I]dentify, within eighteen months, the location of all cul-
verts constructed or maintained by State agencies, that dimin-
ish the number of fish in the manner set forth above, and (2)
fix, within five years after judgment, and thereafter maintain
all culverts built or maintained by any State agency, so that
they do not diminish the number of fish [available for the tribe
to make a moderate living].185
The State opposed the tribes’ motion for partial summary judg-
ment by asserting the tribes were not really concerned about culverts.186
Instead, the State maintained that the tribes sought to establish an “envi-
ronmental servitude,” which the Ninth Circuit rejected in its first review
of the Orrick Decision in 1982.187 The State also contended that the tribes
could establish no factual connection between reduced tribal harvest and
culverts, pinning the blame for the tribes’ inability to make a moderate
181. Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra
note 168, at 23. R
182. See United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), No. CV 9213RSM, 2007 WL
2437166, at *3 (W.D. Wash.).
183. Id. Specifically, the tribes asked the court to declare:
(1) the right of taking fish secured by the Treaties imposes a duty upon the
State of Washington to refrain from diminishing the number of fish pass-
ing through, or to or from, the Tribes’ usual and accustomed fishing
grounds by improperly constructing or maintaining culverts under State-
owned roads and highways; and that (2) the state has violated, and contin-
ues to violate, the duty owned the Tribes under the Stevens Treaties.
Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at *1-2.
186. Washington’s Opposition to Plaintiff Tribes’ Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment, United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), at 1, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash.
2007) (No. C70-9213) [hereinafter Washington Motion].
187. Id. See supra text accompanying note 119. R
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living from fishing on market prices and harvest reductions imposed by
the Pacific Salmon Treaty.188 In the end, according to the State, what the
tribes wanted was veto authority over all State actions.189
Judge Ricardo Martinez, who presided over the so-called “Cul-
verts Case,”190 came down squarely on the side of the tribes and federal
government. First, Judge Martinez evaluated the factual evidence
presented to him. Notwithstanding the State’s arguments that the tribes
could produce no evidence that culverts “affirmatively diminish the
number of fish available for harvest,” the court came to the “inescapable”
conclusion that culvert blockages were “responsible for some portion of
the diminishment,” even if the tribes could not present an exact figure on
the “missing” fish.191 Thus, the court determined that it had a purely legal
matter to resolve: whether the treaty fishing right required the state to
avoid diminishment of the salmon runs through barrier culverts.192
The State insisted the Ninth Circuit had already answered the
question in the negative when it vacated the Orrick Decision, but Judge
Martinez felt this was a mischaracterization of the Ninth Circuit’s rul-
ings.193 The judge noted that although the 1982 three-judge panel re-
versed Judge Orrick on the environmental degradation question, it did
not do so “as conclusively as the State suggests.”194 Instead, the panel
188. Washington Motion, supra note 186, at 2–3, 5. On the Pacific Salmon Treaty, see R
SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 161–72. In addition, Washington argued that the R
case law did not support an implied right to habitat protection. Washington Motion, supra
note 186, at 8–20. First, the State claimed that the tribes misconstrued the “moderate living” R
language from Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658 (1979), which referred to an equitable remedy rather than a treaty right. Washington
Motion, supra note 186, at 8–10. Second, the State claimed that tribes ignored or misunder- R
stood applicable cases, including the real meaning of the reserved water rights doctrine
cases that merely established a priority position for water in times of scarcity. Id. at 10–15.
Finally, the State maintained that the tribes did not satisfy the Ninth Circuit’s requirement
that they present a concrete factual scenario to evaluate the implied habitat right because
the tribes could not define what a “moderate living” meant, meaning they “offer[ed] a legal
rule completely untethered to the facts.” Id. at 15–17.
189. Washington Motion, supra note 186, at 20. The State also filed a cross-motion ask- R
ing for injunctive and declaratory relief against the federal government for “placing a dis-
proportionate burden of meeting the treaty-based duty (if any) on the State” and alleging
mismanagement of federal land that created “a nuisance that unfairly burden[ed] the
State.” United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), 2007 WL 2437166, at *1. Judge Mar-
tinez dismissed the counterclaims based on the government’s argument that it had not
waived sovereign immunity. Id.
190. This article also refers to the case as the Martinez Decision, in keeping with other
significant dispositions under the United States v. Washington line of cases.
191. United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), 2007 WL 2437166, at *3.
192. Id.
193. Id. at *3.
194. Id. at *4.
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modified the habitat right from what it viewed as an “environmental ser-
vitude” to a duty to take “reasonable steps” to protect habitat.195 Judge
Martinez then noted that the en banc panel’s vacatur of both the 1982
panel’s opinion and the Orrick Decision “did not contain [the] broad and
conclusive language necessary to reject the idea of a treaty-based
[habitat] duty in theory as well as in practice.”196 In the end, according to
Judge Martinez, the Ninth Circuit merely held Judge Orrick did not have
a sufficiently particular factual basis before him to decide the issue. The
Ninth Circuit did not reject the “concept of a treaty-based duty to avoid
specific actions which impair the salmon runs.”197 In fact, the appellate
court seemed to “presume” such a duty existed.198
Judge Martinez thought that this case presented precisely the type
of specific factual situation the Ninth Circuit envisioned, and the tribes
had presented the sort of evidence necessary to craft a narrow declara-
tory judgment.199 The court did not buy into the State’s doomsday pre-
dictions of “environmental servitude” in the narrow context of a dispute
over culverts.200 Nor did Judge Martinez accept Washington’s argument
that the term “moderate living” was ambiguous and unenforceable, since
the Supreme Court coined the term,201 not the parties to the treaties.202
Therefore, the court could make use of well-established rules of treaty
construction in reaching a decision concerning the state’s treaty obliga-
tions with respect to culverts.203
195. Id. (quoting the panel decision to the effect that: “[W]e find on the environmental
issue that the State and the Tribes must each take reasonable steps commensurate with the
resources and abilities of each to preserve and enhance the fishery when their projects
threaten then-existing harvest levels”).
196. United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), 2007 WL 2437166, at *4.
197. Id. at *4–5 (citing en banc panel’s holding, as well as the various concurrences and
dissents).
198. Id. at *5 (“The court’s language, however, clearly presumes some obligation on the
part of the State; not a broad ‘general admonition’ as originally imposed by the district
court, but a duty which could be defined by concrete facts presented in a particular
dispute.”).
199. Id. (referencing harvest data and numbers of blocked culverts presented by the
tribes).
200. Id. (“A narrowly-crafted declaratory judgment such as the one requested here does
not raise the specter of a broad ‘environmental servitude’ so feared by the State.”).
201. See supra note 98–99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the “moderate liv- R
ing” phrase introduced by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Pas-
senger Fishing Vessel Ass’n (Passenger Fishing Vessel), 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
202. United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), 2007 WL 2437166, at *5–6 (“‘Mod-
erate living’ . . . is neither a ‘missing term’ in the contract, nor a meaningless provision; it
is a measure created by the Court. To the extent that it needs definition, it would be for the
Court, not the Tribes, to define it.”).
203. Id. at *6.
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Employing a series of long block quotes from prior opinions in the
line of United States v. Washington proceedings, Judge Martinez deter-
mined the treaty right to take fish included a right to habitat protection
that the state had violated through its construction and maintenance of
culverts that blocked fish passage.204 Judge Martinez emphasized that the
treaty fishing right was an essential element of the treaty bargain,205 reit-
erating that the treaty fishing right secured not just an opportunity to
fish but the right to take fish.206 Since the tribes ceded vast expanses of
land to the United States only on the condition that they would retain
their historic fishing rights, the negotiators’ “assurances would only be
meaningful if they carried the implied promise that neither the negotia-
tors nor their successors would take actions that would significantly de-
grade the resource.”207
Emphasizing that he was neither establishing a “broad ‘environ-
mental servitude’ [n]or [imposing] an affirmative duty to take all possi-
ble steps to protect fish runs,” Judge Martinez held, in light of the
negotiators’ assurances, that destructive practices like building culverts
that blocked fish passage violated the treaty fishing right.208 Following
that reasoning, on August 22, 2007, he adopted the tribes’ proposed lan-
guage for the declaratory judgment in its entirety.209
204. Id. at *10.
205. Id. at *7 (quoting Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass’n (Passenger Fishing Vessel), 443 U.S. 658, 675–77 (1979)).
206. Id. at *7–8 (quoting Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Ves-
sel Ass’n (Passenger Fishing Vessel), 443 U.S. at 678–80, and Declaration of historian Richard
White, Dkt. # 296, ¶¶ 8, 9, 11).
207. Id. at *10 (quoting Declaration of historian Richard White, Dkt. # 298, ¶ 6). Moreo-
ver, since both the tribes and the government negotiators thought the fish runs were inex-
haustible and would remain abundant forever, they did not think to include an express
treaty provision protecting the resource from depletion. See id. at *9–10.
208. Id. (indicating the holding was a “narrow directive to refrain from impeding fish
runs in one specific manner” and stating the State’s duty to refrain from constructing bar-
rier culverts “arises directly from the right of taking fish that was assured to the Tribes in
the Treaties, and is necessary to fulfill the promises made to the Tribes regarding the extent
of that right”).
209. The pertinent language was:
The Court hereby declares that the right of taking fish, secured to the
Tribes in the Stevens Treaties, imposes a duty upon the State to refrain
from building or operating culverts under State-maintained roads that
hinder fish passage and thereby diminish the number of fish that would
otherwise be available for Tribal harvest. The Court further declares that
the State of Washington currently owns and operates culverts that violate
this duty.
Id.
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Judge Martinez set the trial date on the remedy for September 24,
2007,210 but the parties agreed to postpone the trial and negotiate a rem-
edy on their own.211 A year later, the parties were unable to agree upon a
remedy.212 Although the court has yet to determine a remedy, and an
appeal to the Ninth Circuit is likely, the Martinez Decision represented a
monumental step toward securing the right to habitat protection. While
the reasoning of the decision could and should have been based on prop-
erty rights principles,213 the Martinez Decision is hardly an outlier in
210. Id.
211. See Frank, supra note 132 (“Cooperation has long been the key to natural resource R
management in Washington. We look forward to sitting down together with the state to
develop a comprehensive plan for fixing the culverts that can be put into action quickly.
The salmon can’t wait much longer.”); Lynda V. Mapes, Culverts: State, Tribes to Negotiate,
SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/local
news/2003859983_culvert30m.html (“[B]oth sides have agreed to settle the case by spring,
after the next legislative session, when lawmakers will have to figure out a way to pay for
culvert repairs.”).
212. Although the parties attempted to agree on a remedy for over a year, they remain
deadlocked. Email from Fronda Woods, supra note 24; Stipulated Amended Pretrial Sched- R
uling Order at 4, United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D.
Wash. 2007) (No. 70-9213) (filed Dec. 1, 2008) (setting trial on the appropriate remedy for
October 13, 2009). Although the communications in the settlement discussions are confi-
dential, the talks likely stalled on the number of culverts to be fixed and the period of time
allowed. Mapes, supra note 157. Given the budgetary woes the state currently faces, it is R
possible that the state simply cannot afford to fix culverts, even at the lethargic pace at
which it has been pursuing repairs. The state’s best hope might be to seek reversal from the
Ninth Circuit on appeal, thereby lightening its duties with respect to culverts.
213. We believe a property rights rationale would make the Martinez Decision more
likely to survive appeals, particularly an appeal to the Supreme Court, which has sug-
gested that tribal fishing rights are property rights, the termination of which would require
constitutional compensation. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
Professor Mary Wood has suggested that the treaty fishing right should be construed as
analogous to a cotenancy, drawing on Ninth Circuit language its second affirmance of
Judge Boldt in 1978. See also Mary Christina Wood, The Tribal Right to Wildlife Capital (Part
I): Applying the Principles of Sovereignty to Protect Imperiled Wildlife Populations, 37 IDAHO L.
REV 1, 38 (2000) (citing Puget Sound Gilnetters Ass’n v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Western
Dist. of Wash., 573 F.2d 1123, 1128 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978). The analogy could invoke the doc-
trine of waste, which proscribes unreasonable behavior among cotenants that produces
substantial reductions in value—although the application of the doctrine varies widely de-
pending on applicable statutes and on whether the offending activity is classified as affirm-
ative or permissive waste. See generally 8 RICHARD R. POWELL & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §56.05 (2008). See also infra note 254. However, when he was on R
the Ninth Circuit, Justice Kennedy cast doubt on the applicability of the cotenancy analogy.
Puget Sound Gillnetters, 573 F.2d at 1134 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Given Justice Kennedy’s
influence on the Court and his affinity to property rights, tribal advocates ignore Justice
Kennedy’s sentiments at their peril. See Michael C. Blumm & Sherry Bosse, Justice Kennedy
and the Environment: Property, States Rights, and a Persistent Search for Nexus, 82 WASH. L.
REV. 665 (2007).
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treaty fishing rights jurisprudence. In fact, the decision is the logical re-
sult of a line of cases that followed Judge Orrick’s 1980 decision first
recognizing the habitat right.
VI. THE MARTINEZ DECISION’S ANTECEDENTS: HABITAT
PROTECTION IN OTHER CONTEXTS
This section discusses some of the judicial antecedents of the Mar-
tinez Decision. It then explains why the results of the case are fully consis-
tent with property law principles governing non-possessory rights in
land like profits a` prendre. The section then proceeds to explore a number
of reasons why the tribal right to habitat protection, properly under-
stood, will neither threaten to establish an environmental servitude nor
overwhelm the courts with numerous claims. Although the exact con-
tours of the habitat right remain undefined and continue to be the subject
of litigation,214 the Martinez Decision confirmed the implicit assumption
relied upon in several cases following the Orrick Decision: the notion that
a corollary right to habitat protection is incorporated within the treaty
right of taking fish. In these cases, although the habitat question was not
squarely before the courts, the courts almost invariably relied on the
treaty fishing right to enjoin specific habitat-damaging activities.215 The
We think that treaty fishing rights are clearly property rights, and that the coten-
ancy analogy may be useful given the “in common with” language of the treaties. See supra
note 2 and accompanying text. But the basis of the property right in the treaties is in the R
“right of taking fish.” Such a right is most closely analogous to a profit a` prendre, actually a
piscary profit. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 445 nn.183–84. See also RESTATEMENT R
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.2 (2000) (collecting cases concluding that hunting and
fishing rights are profits); JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND
LICENSES IN LAND §1.12, at 1–32 (2009) (noting that hunting and fishing rights are com-
monly categorized as profits). Because the profit is shared “in common with” white settlers,
the analogy to cotenancy is not inapt. Both cotenancy law and profit law are grounded on
protecting the rights-holders against unreasonable interference with the exercise of the
right. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, supra, § 4.12 (explaining the “no unreasonable
interference” rule for profits and stating that “[i]n the event of irreconcilable conflicts in
use, priority of use rights is determined by priority in time. . . .”); POWELL & WOLF, supra,
§ 56.05 (explaining the waste doctrine); 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 70.03 (David A.
Thomas, ed. 2005) (characterizing waste as unreasonable conduct causing permanent
harm).
214. Tim Klass, Tribes demand speed up culvert fixes for salmon, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct.
13, 2009, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2010057360_
apwasalmonculverts1stldwritethru.html. See also Stipulated Amended Pretrial Scheduling
Order, supra note 212, at 4. R
215. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 252–71 (describing cases both preced- R
ing and following the Orrick Decision that affirmed the habitat protection element of the
treaty fishing right).
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results, therefore, are the logical forerunners of the Martinez Decision,
helping to reinforce the fact that the decision is hardly an outlier.
A prime example of a case adumbrating the Martinez Decision was
the 1980 case of No Oilport! v. Carter,216 in which tribes challenged con-
struction of a proposed pipeline that would have crossed Puget Sound
and two rivers subject to treaty fishing rights.217 Judge Belloni ruled that
the project satisfied the requirements of environmental statutes, but he
determined sedimentation from burying the pipeline under rivers cov-
ered by the treaties could adversely affect salmon populations.218 Conse-
quently, he ordered an evidentiary hearing as to whether the pipeline
would cause the “fish habitat to be degraded such that the rearing or
production potential of the fish will be impaired or the size or quality of
the run diminished.”219 If the project did have such an adverse effect, it
could not go forward as planned. As it turned out, the State of Washing-
ton’s concerns over potential oil spills and fire prevented the project’s
construction anyway.220
In 1985, the Ninth Circuit held the implied habitat component of
the treaty fishing right included water levels needed to sustain fish
habitat. In Kittitas Reclamation District v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dis-
trict,221 the Yakama Nation, which had been barred from exercising its
treaty fishing rights for some years due to low fish populations, chal-
lenged the Bureau of Reclamation’s plan to reduce flows from the Cle
Elum Dam to begin winter storage at the end of the irrigation season.222
The district court ordered measures to protect the nests of salmon eggs
in accordance with the treaty fishing right, recognizing that the reduced
flows would threaten salmon redds in the Yakima River with dewater-
ing.223 Despite three successive opinions of the Ninth Circuit, the district
court’s order requiring the Bureau to undertake salmon habitat protec-
tion measures remained unscathed.224
Another case anticipating the Martinez Decision occurred in 1988,
when the Muckleshoot and Suquamish Tribes challenged a dredge and
216. No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
217. Id. at 344, 373.
218. Id. See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text noting that Judge Belloni also R
presided over the Sohappy v. Smith (or United States v. Oregon) proceedings.
219. No Oilport!, 520 F. Supp. at 372–73.
220. SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 257. R
221. 763 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1985).
222. Id. at 1033–34. See also Blumm and Swift, supra note 9, at 465. R
223. Kittitas Reclamation District v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District, 763 F.2d at
1034 (describing the relief ordered by the district court judge in an unpublished opinion
and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit).
224. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 466–67 (describing three different opinions of R
the Ninth Circuit, all of which affirmed the district court).
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fill permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers that would have al-
lowed development of a large-scale marina in Elliot Bay.225 The permit-
ted activity would have destroyed prime salmon fishing habitat, as well
as a usual and accustomed fishing area.226 In a well-reasoned decision,
Judge Thomas Zilly referred to the treaty fishing right as a “property
right which may not be abrogated without specific and express Congres-
sional authority.”227 Judge Zilly recognized that implied in the treaty fish-
ing right were two discrete elements: (1) a right of access to particular
geographic sites, and (2) a guarantee of a sufficient harvest of fish to
meet moderate living requirements.228 Even though the development
would not necessarily affect the tribes’ moderate living needs, the court
enjoined the marina permit because the proposed project would pre-
clude access to usual and accustomed treaty fishing places.229 In so doing,
the court confirmed that the treaty access right could protect usual and
accustomed grounds from habitat destruction.230
Nearly a decade later, in 1996, the Army Corps of Engineers, ap-
parently learning from its prior experience, denied a permit for a fish
farm operator to open a net pen fish farm in Puget Sound based on the
treaty fishing right.231 The agency determined that the net pen would
have blocked access to a tribal fishing ground,232 and a district court up-
held the decision based on the federal government’s fiduciary obligation
to account for the tribe’s treaty rights. The court rejected the permit ap-
plicant’s suggestion that the court “conduct a balancing test which views
the right to access in relation to the supply of the proper portion of fish,”
noting that the access and moderate living aspects of the treaty right
must be satisfied separately.233
In many respects, these cases anticipated the Martinez Decision in
that all of the judges enjoined habitat-damaging projects based on the
treaty fishing right, although the opinions did not directly address the
question of whether the treaty fishing right encompassed a right to
225. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
226. Id. at 1505. See also id. at 1515 (“No case has been presented to this Court holding
that it is permissible to take a small portion of a tribal usual and accustomed fishing
ground . . . without an act of Congress, or to permit limitation of access to a tribal fishing
place for a purpose other than conservation.”).
227. Id. at 1512 (citing Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413
(1968)).
228. Id. at 1513.
229. Id.
230. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 257. The tribes later reached a settle- R
ment with the developer, which allowed construction of a reconfigured marina. Id.
231. Nw. Sea Farms v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 931 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
232. Id. at 1518.
233. Id. at 1521–22.
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salmon habitat protection. The Martinez Decision bridges that gap, em-
ploying the culvert as the factual vehicle demanded by the Ninth
Circuit.234
At the heart of these cases is judicial recognition of a treaty-pro-
tected property right (that is, the piscary profit). As the Supreme Court
first articulated in 1905 in Winans, by reserving for themselves the “right
of taking fish,” the tribes created “a servitude upon every piece of land as
though described therein.”235 The tribes’ reservation of this profit was the
linchpin of the Stevens treaties, facilitating one of the largest peaceful
real estate transaction in history and allowing the Pacific Northwest to
avoid the full-scale Indian Wars that engulfed so much of the rest of the
country.236
In Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States,237 a case involving
Great Lakes tribes’ reserved hunting and fishing rights, the Supreme
Court reiterated that tribes’ reserved treaty rights constituted property
rights that could only be abrogated by clear and plain legislation.238
Moreover, the Court indicated that the government would owe compen-
sation under the Fifth Amendment for destruction of the property rights
retained by the tribes in a treaty.239 Thus, the Stevens treaties, as the su-
preme law of the land, preclude significant habitat-destroying activities
in the absence of explicit congressional authorization and accompanying
compensation. Although Judge Martinez did not expressly discuss the
property rights nature of the treaty fishing right, the decision reflects one
of the essential features of the piscary profit—“a negative servitude ([or]
restriction) limiting activities that jeopardize the supply of fish necessary
to furnish the tribes a moderate living.”240
The habitat dimension of the treaty fishing right, however, is not
without limits. At least one court has held the right does not protect
salmon and shellfish habitat from de minimis interference.241 In Lummi
Indian Nation v. Cunningham, Judge John Coughenour determined, in an
unreported opinion, that disposal of dredged spoil from the port of Bel-
lingham’s shipping channel into Bellingham Harbor would have a negli-
234. United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), 2007 WL 2437166, at *4–5.
235. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). See also supra notes 41–47 and R
accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. R
237. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
238. Id. at 413.
239. Id.
240. SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 258. R
241. Lummi Indian Nation v. Cunningham, No. C92-1023C (W.D. Wash.) (last filing
Nov. 30, 1992).
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gible effect on salmon migration.242 Since the dumping resulted in only a
de minimis interference with treaty rights, the court refused to enjoin the
project.243 Judge Coughenour concluded that “[t]he plaintiff is correct in
asserting that ‘determination of the violation of a treaty fishing right is
not a balancing test.’ However, before the bright line test can be asserted,
the interference with the treaty right must reach a level of legal signifi-
cance.”244 Consequently, interferences with treaty fishing rights must
meet a “legal significance” threshold in order to be actionable.
Confining the treaty protection to only those habitat-degrading
activities that satisfy a significance threshold makes sense in view of the
purpose of the treaty fishing right and background principles of prop-
erty law. As the Supreme Court established in Passenger Fishing Vessel,
the Stevens treaties guarantee the tribes a right to make a moderate liv-
ing through fishing.245 Therefore, tribes can wield the habitat right only
to the extent they can link a habitat degrading activity to tribal members’
inability to make a moderate living.246 Using culverts as an example,
tribes can restrain a state from constructing or maintaining fish-blocking
culverts that deprive them of the opportunity to achieve a moderate liv-
ing but they do not have veto power over all culverts.247 Although the
moderate living standard may “[lack] a degree of precision,” it is well-
established Supreme Court precedent and has been repeatedly invoked
by lower courts.248 Moreover, the standard gives a judge considerable
242. Id. at *4.
243. Id.
244. Id. Note, however, that a handful of fish could meet the significance threshold if,
for example, an upriver tribe wants spring chinook for ceremonial purposes, and only a
few dozen fish from that run return each year.
245. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658, 686 (1979). See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. R
246. See Brief of United States in Response to Washington’s Summary Judgment Mo-
tion and Amici Counties Memorandum in Support Thereof, at 6, 18, United States v. Wash-
ington (Martinez Decision), No. CV 9213RSM, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash.) (No. 70-9213)
(limiting enjoinable actions to those producing more than de minimis injuries is also consis-
tent with the federal government’s position).
247. Compare id. (“While tying the State’s obligations to fix fish-blocking culverts to the
moderate living standard may not be ideal, there is . . . no better standard. . . . This lan-
guage is intended to be completely clear that any remedy in this case should focus on those
culverts that have more than a de minimis impact. . . .”), with Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, United States v. Washington (Martinez
Decision), No. CV 9213RSM, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash.) (No. 70-9213) (“The equitable
remedy should be shaped by appropriate equitable principles and by the facts presented by
this particular dispute. The culverts at issue here are those that block fish passage.”).
248. Brief of United States in Response to Washington’s Summary Judgment Motion
and Amici Counties Memorandum in Support Thereof, at 6, 18, United States v. Washing-
ton (Martinez Decision), No. CV 9213RSM, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash.) (No. 70-9213).
\\server05\productn\N\NMN\49-3-4\NMN3401.txt unknown Seq: 43 28-MAY-10 12:55
Summer-Fall 2009] INDIAN TREATY FISHING RIGHTS 695
discretion in fashioning a remedy in cases involving the habitat right,
thereby assuaging erroneous concerns that the habitat right is the
equivalent of an environmental servitude that would confer an unfair
windfall to tribes.249
Just as the moderate living standard affords judges the flexibility
and discretion in fashioning a remedy that avoids establishing environ-
mental servitudes, principles of property law limit judicial authority to
restrain only those actions that constitute unreasonable interferences. As
Winans and Menominee Tribe made clear,250 the treaty fishing right is a
protected property right, which we have described as a piscary profit.251
The common law has long taught that holders of such property rights
can restrain others from unreasonably interfering with the exercise of a
profit a` prendre.252 An “unreasonable interference” in the context of the
Stevens treaties is habitat degradation that results in decreased fish
populations, which, in turn, prevents tribes from being able to make a
moderate living from fishing.253
249. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 489–90 (describing cases in which courts’ deci- R
sions seem to reflect a “judicial unwillingness to express the scope of the treaty fishing right
in a manner that might require a restoration of conditions that existed at treaty time”); see
generally Michael C. Blumm et al., Judicial Termination of Treaty Water Rights: The Snake River
Case, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 449 (1999) (analyzing the flawed logic of the opinion in Nez Perce
Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994), in which the court concluded that
the tribe did not exercise a property interest over the fish, and thus, were not entitled to
compensation for damages affecting it’s fishing activities). See also City of Sherrill v. Oneida
Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197, 213–14 (noting equitable considerations figure
into the remedial stage of a case involving Oneida Nation’s claim that parcels purchased in
historic homeland was free from state taxation).
250. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). See supra notes 41–47 and accompany- R
ing text. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). See supra notes 237–239 and R
accompanying text.
251. See supra text accompanying note 47. R
252. See, e.g., Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127, 1128 (Q.B. 1707) (holding
owner of duck pond had cause of action against person who drove away ducks with gun-
fire because “he that hinders another in his trade or livelihood is liable”); Union Oil Co. v.
Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing action by commercial fishers against oil
companies for damages resulting from an oil spill, as long as fishermen prove that the
pollution decreased aquatic life resulting in reduced profits); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 4.9 (2000) (“[T]he holder of the servient estate is entitled to make
any use of the servient estate that does not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the
servitude.”); id. at § 1.1(1)–1.2(2) (“a servitude is a legal device that creates a right or an
obligation that runs with land” and includes profits a` prendre).
253. For a more detailed review of the probable scope of the habitat right, see Blumm &
Swift, supra note 9, at 489–500. R
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Thus, only activities that restrict tribes’ ability to earn a moderate
living from fish unreasonably interfere with the tribes’ piscary profit.254
The courts’ equitable discretion should mollify anxieties that tribes may
seek to establish an “environmental servitude with open-ended and un-
foreseeable consequences,”255 especially since judges may restrain only
those actions that unreasonably interference with the piscary profit in
particularized fact scenarios.
Equitable considerations attendant to both the moderate living
standard and the unreasonable interference limit foreclose the possibility
of the feared environmental servitude. At the same time, the standards
provide at least some guidance regarding the scope of the right for tribes
seeking to enforce the habitat dimension of the treaty fishing right. Case
law relying on the moderate living standard in the context of regulating
non-tribal fishers is well-established,256 and the principles of those cases
can guide courts and litigants as to the scope of the treaty fishing right
and appropriate remedies in regulating non-tribal harvest.257
VII. THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES: THE FEDERAL ROLE
AND THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY
Notwithstanding the important step Judge Martinez took by
enunciating the habitat right, important questions remain unanswered.
254. Cf. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (sug-
gesting a similar result for the Indians and non-Indians would be achieved through the
doctrine of waste, which prohibits co-owners from unreasonable actions).
255. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374, 1381 (9th Cir. 1983) (expressing con-
cerns at the scope of the treaty habitat right).
256. See United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), No. CV 9213RSM, 2007 WL
2437166, at *5 (W.D. Wash.).
257. One of us has previously set forth relevant lessons from the treaty fishing rights
cases that courts can apply in cases involving the habitat right. See Blumm, supra note 2, at
272–77:
There is an obligation to protect salmon habitat necessary to effectuate the
treaty fishing right, but the treaties do not demand a return to the environ-
mental conditions that existed at the time the treaties were signed. The
treaty obligations run not merely to the federal and state governments
but . . . to private parties as well. Private parties have no more authority
than governments to exclude tribes from their fishing grounds, to deprive
them of their fair share of the salmon runs, or to destroy treaty-protected
fish. However, private parties requiring government approval for their de-
velopments may use the approval process to demonstrate compliance
with treaty obligations.
Id. at 275. In addition, state or federal governments may not participate in or license activi-
ties that unreasonably interfere with exercise of the piscary profit. Id. at 275–76 (describing
five requirements with which governments can comply in order to avoid unreasonable
interference with the tribes’ property right).
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First, despite the fact that Judge Martinez issued his opinion in 2007, the
remedy remains unresolved. Second, the case opened the door to other
litigation opportunities for the tribes, including claims against the federal
government—with whom the tribes have worked closely throughout
the United States v. Washington proceedings. This section explores these
issues.
A. Fashioning a Remedy for the Martinez Decision
As previously mentioned,258 the tribes asked Judge Martinez for
an injunction “requiring Washington to identify and then to open cul-
verts under state roads and highways that obstruct fish passage, for fish
runs returning to or passing through the usual and accustomed grounds
and stations of the plaintiff tribes.”259 Despite a year’s worth of settle-
ment discussions, the parties were unable to agree on an appropriate
remedy.260 Consequently, the questions of which culverts need repair or
replacement and when they need to be replaced is again before Judge
Martinez.261
Although the settlement discussions are confidential, the parties
likely reached an impasse due to the cost of dealing with barrier culverts
at a more rapid pace.262 Washington has exhibited a willingness to repair
and replace culverts over the years, but it has proceeded at a fairly slow
speed.263 At the time of the ruling, the state planned to devote $69 million
258. See supra notes 169–170, 176–177 and accompanying text. R
259. United States v. State of Washington (Martinez Decision), No. CV 9213RSM, 2007
WL 2437166, at *2 (W.D. Wash.) (quoting Request for Determination, Dkt. #1, at 1). Specifi-
cally, the tribes asked that the inventory of problem culverts be completed within 18
months, and they wanted all barrier culverts to be fixed within five years. Id.
260. See Woods, supra note 62 and accompanying text. R
261. Interview with Peter Monson, supra note 168. See also Krista J. Kapralos, Tribes, R
State Will Return to Court over Salmon, HERALDNET, Apr. 6, 2009, available at http://www.
heraldnet.com/article/20090406/NEWS01/704069910/-1/RSS02.
262. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. See also Kapralos, supra note 261; Mapes, R
supra note 157 (suggesting that in addition to the “hundreds of millions of dollars” needed
to fix the culverts, another stumbling block might have been the tribes’ unwillingness to
“create a potential political liability in an election year for Gov. Christine Gregoire,” an ally
on tribal gaming and social service issues).
263. See notes 146–151, supra and accompanying text. See also Robert McClure, Tribes R
Win Ruling on Salmon, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 23, 2007, available at http://seattle
pi.nwsource.com/local/328681_salmon23.html (noting that state has opened up only 480
stream miles of habitat since 1991); Editorial Board, Salmon: State Doesn’t Get It, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 26, 2007, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/
329098_salmoned.html (suggesting that state has a long history of “foot dragging,” writing
Washington “just can’t seem to let go of its worn-out excuses about its expenses and oh-so-
strenuous efforts. When the case began in early 2001, the refrain was the same, with then-
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to fix state-owned culverts over 12 years.264 This funding notwithstand-
ing, the state faces a significant budgetary shortfall and it appears either
unwilling or unable to accelerate that pace. Additionally, given the finan-
cial crisis enveloping the state, whether that low figure will even materi-
alize is unclear.265 The question remains as to whether Judge Martinez
will proceed to establish barrier culvert priorities, a budget, and a repair
schedule for cash-strapped state agencies.
Judge Martinez must also determine how he wishes to craft the
remedy. Courts have great latitude in using their equitable powers to
devise appropriate injunctive relief.266 Judge Belloni understood the
scope of this power when he retained continuing jurisdiction in Sohappy
v. Smith (now United States v. Oregon).267 Under his watchful eye, the cur-
rent co-management systems involving both state and tribal manage-
Gov. Gary Locke and the attorney general, Gregoire, saying they were ‘disappointed’ that
the tribes went to court”).
264. McClure, supra note 154. This figure was in addition to the $26 million spent on R
fixing culverts since 1991, but far below the estimated “hundreds of millions of dollars”
needed to fix all of the state-owned barrier culverts. Mapes, supra note 157. R
265. Governor Christine Gregoire’s 2008 Budget called for just $15.3 million to replace
culverts impeding access to spawning grounds, which was an increase over the prior figure
but well below the hundreds of millions required to fix the problem. Washington State
Office of Financial Management, Gov. Gregoire’s Proposed 2008 Budget for Capital Con-
struction, http://www.ofm.wa.gov/budget08/highlights/capital/proposal.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 3, 2009). However, the Governor’s December 2008 budget for 2009–2011 made no
specific reference to the total funds set aside for culvert repair and replacement. See Wash-
ington State Office of Financial Management, 2009–11 Budget Highlights, http://www.
ofm.wa.gov/budget09/highlights/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). An editorial in the Seattle
Times indicated Governor Gregoire ordered state agencies to cut more than $590 million
and proposed to cut an additional five to six billion dollars in the next budget cycle. James
N. Gregory, As Olympia Wrestles with a Budget Crisis, Can It Avoid the Mistakes of 1931?,
SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 5, 2008, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/
2008474718_opin06gregory.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).With regard to private land-
owner restoration work, the Washington Salmon Recovery Funding Board awarded $19.8
million in grants to private landowners for habitat restoration, including culvert replace-
ment. See Press Release, Washington State Recreation & Conservation Office, Gov. Gregoire
Announces More than $19.8 Million in Grants for Salmon Recovery, Dec. 12, 2008, available at
http://www.rco.wa.gov/documents/Press_Releases/2008/gov_announces_millions_for_
salmon_recovery.htm.
266. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (“The essence of
equity jurisdiction has been the power of the [court] to do equity and to mould each decree
to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished
it.”); Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The district
court has broad latitude in fashioning equitable relief when necessary to remedy an estab-
lished wrong.”).
267. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text. R
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ment of harvest levels for the Columbia River came into being.268
Requiring a similar level of cooperation between the State of Washington
and the Puget Sound tribes might force the parties to come to an agree-
ment on culvert prioritization and timetables. Another solution would be
to appoint a special master to oversee the particulars of the culvert repair
schedule and budget.269 Such approaches to establishing an appropriate
remedy in complex litigation are not unusual.270
Should the State prove unwilling to participate meaningfully in a
cooperative arrangement under the court’s continuing jurisdiction or to
adhere to the conclusions of a special master, the court could take on the
role of a judicial “fishmaster.”271 Under this scenario, the court would
create a “consent decree structure whereby the states and tribes [would
develop] a judicially supervised and enforceable plan” for culvert re-
pair.272 Indeed, in the context of treaty fishing rights in the United States v.
Washington proceedings, Judge Boldt eventually used this authority, al-
though as a last resort.273 Given the criticism leveled at and resistance to
268. See, e.g., Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 460–62 (describing developments in co- R
management of salmon resources under the continuing jurisdiction of both Judges Belloni
and Boldt); Mary Christina Wood, The Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (Part I): Apply-
ing Principles of Sovereignty to Protect Imperiled Wildlife Populations, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 16–17
(2000) (describing Judge Belloni’s role in establishing the “innovative framework” for har-
vest regulation in Pacific Northwest).
269. See Washington v. Wash. Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n (Passenger
Fishing Vessel), 443 U.S. 658, 686 (1979) (“[A]fter determining that at the time of the treaties
the resource involved was necessary to the Indians’ welfare, the Court typically ordered a
trial judge or special master, in his discretion, to devise some apportionment that assured
that the Indians’ reasonable livelihood needs would be met.”). See also Alexis C. Fox, Com-
ment, Using Special Masters to Advance the Goals of Animal Protection Law, 15 ANIMAL L. 87, 92
(2008) (“Unlike generalist judges who preside over formal court proceedings, special mas-
ters act as expert decision makers or judicial adjuncts who take a more active role in resolv-
ing specific issues in complex cases.”) (internal citations omitted). The authority for use of a
special master derives from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53.
(describing limits to the use of special masters).
270. See Fox, supra note 269 (describing expansive use of special masters by judges at R
present); Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of Special Masters, 2 WIDENER L.
SYMP. J. 235 (1997) (explaining the rise of and critiquing legitimacy of special masters in
complex litigation); Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to
Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part II): Instilling a Fiduciary
Obligation in Governance, 39 ENVTL. L. 91, 116 (2009) (advocating for the use of special mas-
ters in adjudication of public trust violations).
271. See infra note 273 and sources cited therein. R
272. See Wood, supra note 268, at 115 (describing the type of systems put in place by R
Judges Belloni and Boldt to deal with fish harvest allocations).
273. See Puget Sound Gillnetters v. U.S. District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir.
1978) (“The state’s extraordinary machinations in resisting [Judge Boldt’s] decree have
forced the district court to take over a large share of the management of the state’s fishery
in order to enforce its decrees.”) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Washington,
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orders issued by judges who use the full scope of their authority, shrewd
judges would use this option only when all else fails.274 Still, taking on
the role of “fishmaster” remains a viable option should the State of
Washington and the tribes remain at loggerheads over remedial
solutions.
B. The Scope of the Treaty Right to Habitat Protection
When the tribes initiated the Culverts Case, the State of Washing-
ton immediately charged that the tribes’ intentions were broader than
merely seeking a judicial resolution of the culvert issue.275 If the Martinez
Decision withstands appellate review, the State is potentially liable for a
wide variety of habitat-damaging activities.276 For starters, the tribes
could seek resolution of the other destructive activities first presented to
Judge Boldt some 40 years ago.277 Although Judge Martinez expressly
cautioned that he was not recognizing a “broad ‘environmental servi-
tude,’” the tribes have established a winning strategy for addressing
state or state-permitted activities that degrade salmonid habitat and im-
520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975) (Burns, J., concurring) (“The record in this
case . . . make[s] it crystal clear that it has been recalcitrance of Washington State officials
(and their vocal non-Indian commercial and sports fishing allies) which produced the de-
nial of Indian rights requiring intervention by the district court.”). In the context of Endan-
gered Species Act litigation over the effects of the Columbia and Snake River hydropower
systems on Pacific salmon populations, Judge James Redden has used his authority to insti-
tute a multisovereign consultation process. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisher-
ies Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 936–38 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding Judge Redden’s use of 90-day
status reports and a “failure report” requirement). See also Michael C. Blumm & Hallison T.
Putnam, Imposing Judicial Restraints on the ‘Art of Deception’: The Courts Cast a Skeptical Eye
on Columbia Basin Salmon Restoration Efforts, 38 ENVTL. L. 47, 55 (2008) (discussing injunctive
relief Judge Redden ordered). Judge Martinez similarly required 60-day status reports
throughout the negotiation process regarding the remedy in the Culverts Case, as well.
Joint Status Report at 1, United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), 2007 WL 2437166
(W.D. Wash. 2007).
274. See supra notes 87–93 and accompanying text (describing Judge Boldt’s oversight R
and public reaction). Experiences like that of Judge Boldt have deterred some courts from
using the full extent of their equitable authority. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, v.
Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1062–63 (D. Nev. 1985).
275. See supra notes 164–166 and accompanying text. R
276. The State will almost certainly appeal the Martinez Decision once the remedy issue
is settled, given the potential scope of the habitat right and the finances involved. Interview
with Peter C. Monson, supra note 168. R
277. The tribes claimed that logging, industrial pollution, and obstructions in fish-bear-
ing streams violated the implied habitat component of the treaty fishing right. United
States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), 384 F. Supp. at 328. Presumably, “obstructions” re-
ferred to more than just culverts, potentially encompassing effects from dams. See also
Lewis, supra note 31, at 284–86 (exploring opportunities for tribes to leverage the habitat R
protection right).
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pede tribal members’ ability to make a moderate living.278 The strategy is
simple: pick one of the myriad activities that degrade salmon habitat,
connect the degradation to the depressed salmon populations through
factual evidence, cite the prior treaty cases and the canons of treaty inter-
pretation, and assert that diminished salmon numbers prohibit the tribal
harvest from providing tribal members a “moderate living.”
Beyond the broad implications of the State’s obligation to protect
fish habitats, the Martinez Decision raises the question of federal duties
under the treaty habitat right.279 The Supreme Court has never distin-
guished between the duties of the federal government, state govern-
ments, or private landowners (i.e., federal grantees) under the Stevens
treaties.280 Throughout the four decade-long United States v. Washington
proceedings, the federal government and the tribes have been close al-
278. United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), 2007 WL 2437166, at *10 (W.D.
Wash.). Nearly three decades ago, the Orrick Decision identified certain environmental con-
ditions that must be satisfied in order to ensure the survival of salmonids: “(1) access to and
from the sea, (2) an adequate supply of good-quality water, (3) a sufficient amount of suita-
ble gravel for spawning and egg incubation, (4) an ample supply of food, and (5) sufficient
shelter.” United States v. Washington (Orrick Decision), 506 F. Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash.
1980), aff’d. in part and vacated in part, 759 F.2d 1353, 1358–60 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting the
Joint Biology Statement between the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and the Washington De-
partments of Fisheries and Game). Judge Orrick proceeded to describe a number of human-
caused impacts that resulted in the destruction of salmon spawning and rearing habitat,
including “watershed alterations, water storage dams, industrial developments, stream
channel alterations, and residential developments.” Id. (quoting the Joint Biology State-
ment). Specifically, he determined that quality habitat was destroyed by the “urbanization
and intensive settlement of the area, the rapid development of water power, lumbering and
irrigation and the pollution of the watersheds. . . .” Id. (quoting the Joint Biology State-
ment). Each of these destructive activities represents a potential avenue to broaden the
scope of the habitat right.
279. The tribes likely have other claims against local governments and private individu-
als. See infra note 280 and accompanying text. In the geographic area covered by the Marti- R
nez Decision, several local governments could be liable for barrier culverts. An Adopt-A-
Stream Foundation study indicated about 58 percent of culverts in eight watersheds in
North King County and Snohomish County blocked fish passage. Schwarzen, supra note
153. Most of the barrier culverts assessed in the study were on private property and failed R
to meet current state standards. Id. The tribes did not join these parties in the Martinez
Decision, at least in part, because the introduction of private parties would create case man-
agement complications. See Email from John Sledd, Attorney, Kanji & Katzen, PLLC, to
Jane Steadman, Law Student, Lewis & Clark Law School (April 21, 2009 09:17 PST) (on file
with authors).
280. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 9, at 417, 442–43 (criticizing the initial Ninth Circuit R
panel because United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) established the obligations under
the treaty fishing provision ran to successors in interest). See Winans, 198 U.S. at 381–82
(indicating the treaty was enforceable both “against the United States and its grantees as
well as against the State and its grantees”).
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lies,281 but judicial affirmation of the implied right to habitat protection
may very well encourage the tribes to tackle some of the many federal
activities that inhibit salmon returns.
The most obvious federal habitat-destroying activity the tribes
could pursue is the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest
Service’s construction and maintenance of culverts on federal lands in
the Pacific Northwest. The federal government manages over 41 million
acres of land in Washington and Oregon, including 122,000 miles of
roads that use culverts.282 A 2001 General Accounting Office (GAO) re-
port indicated that the Forest Service and BLM inventoried at least 2,600
federally-owned barrier culverts, but estimated up to 5,500 actually ex-
ist.283 The report concluded that the salmon habitat blocked by the cul-
verts represented “some of the best remaining habitat for salmon and
other aquatic life, often serving as refuge areas for the recovery of listed
species.”284 The GAO identified budgetary constraints, other priorities,
lengthy federal and state project approval processes, and short seasonal
“windows of opportunity” as factors delaying progress on the removal of
fish passage barriers on federal lands.285 However, the Martinez Decision
certainly suggests the implied habitat protection right under the treaties
would override these bureaucratic encumbrances.
As with the state duties, the federal duties likely go well beyond
culverts. Virtually all the known causes of salmon decline could be the
281. Indeed, throughout the entire post-Stevens treaty era, the federal government and
tribes have teamed up against the states on multiple occasions, including in cases for which
the tribes needed the participation of the federal government to allow them to pursue
claims against the state due to the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Nikel-Zueger, supra note
9, at 13 (“The ensuing legal history was one between states, which attempted to deprive the R
Indians of the rights established under the Stevens’ treaties, and the federal government,
which tried to uphold those rights.”); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Sohappy
v. Smith (Belloni Decision), 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969); United States v. Washington, 384
F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d sub nom. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Pas-
senger Fishing Vessel Ass’n (Passenger Fishing Vessel), 443 U.S. 658, 669 (1979). Compare
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281–88 (1997) (holding the Eleventh Amend-
ment barred the tribe’s suit for declaratory judgment that it owned the lakebed of Lake
Coeur d’Alene, and that Ex Parte Young exception did not apply where case directly impli-
cated state sovereignty), with Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (holding that exec-
utive order creating Coeur d’Alene Reservation reserved submerged lands of Lake Coeur
d’Alene to the tribe in a case in which federal government sued state as trustee for the
tribe).
282. GAO REPORT, supra note 134, at 1. R
283. Id. at 2, 5. See also supra note 134 (noting that the General Accounting Office R
changed its name to the Government Accountability Office in 2004).
284. See id. at 4.
285. Id. at 9.
\\server05\productn\N\NMN\49-3-4\NMN3401.txt unknown Seq: 51 28-MAY-10 12:55
Summer-Fall 2009] INDIAN TREATY FISHING RIGHTS 703
target of a lawsuit under the treaty right to habitat protection.286 For ex-
ample, tribes could address the damage done by federally owned and
operated dams to salmon habitat, which has been the subject of extensive
Endangered Species Act287 (ESA) litigation in the Pacific Northwest.288
Unlike those cases, the tribes would not need to limit their claims to ef-
fects on listed species, nor would they be limited to the narrow “sur-
vival” and “recovery” constructs of the ESA.289 Instead, any activities that
degrade the habitat of any salmonid used by the tribes to pursue a “mod-
erate living” would be fair game.290 With the Martinez Decision as sup-
port, the tribes could target virtually any federally-permitted activities
286. See, e.g., Jane G. Steadman, Protecting Water Quality and Salmon in the Columbia Ba-
sin: The Case for State Certification of Federal Dams, 38 ENVTL. L. 1331, 1332–35 (2008) (describ-
ing the negative effects of various human activities on salmon populations and detailing
hydropower’s effects in particular).
287. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2000).
288. The tribes have been parties to much of this litigation. See generally Blumm et al.,
supra note 25 (providing detailed account of ESA litigation over the hydropower system in R
the Columbia and Snake basins). However, recent agreements between the Bonneville
Power Administration, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and sev-
eral Columbia River treaty tribes—in what have come to be known as the “Columbia Basin
Accords”—will foreclose some tribal involvement in litigation over the federal Columbia
River hydropower system for at least 10 years. William Yardley, Deal Gives Money to Tribes
to Drop Role in Fish Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/04/08/us/08dams.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). In exchange for dropping out
of the litigation, the Umatilla, Warm Springs, Yakama, and Colville tribes and the Colum-
bia River Intertribal Fish Commission will receive over $900 million, most of which will be
put toward habitat improvement and hatchery expansion. See Memorandum of Agreement
Among the Umatilla, Warm Springs and Yakama Tribes, Bonneville Power Administration,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (April 4, 2008), available
at http://www.salmonrecovery.gov/Biological_opinions/FCRPS/2008_biop/Columbia
BasinFishAccords.cfm (last visited Oct. 4, 2009). Notably absent from the accords is the Nez
Perce Tribe of Idaho, which reached an impasse in negotiations with the federal agencies in
August 2008. Press Release, Nez Perce, Tribal Executive Committee, Nez Perce Tribe Main-
tains Stance in Hydro Litigation (Aug. 20, 2008) (on file with author). The tribe remains a
plaintiff in the 2008 BiOp litigation, alongside several conservation groups, fishing groups,
and the State of Oregon. Id.
289. The argument for removal of the Snake River dams, for example, would be much
improved by this broader habitat right. See Lewis, supra note 31, at 284. See also Michael C. R
Blumm et al., Saving Snake River Water and Salmon Simultaneously: The Biological, Economic,
and Legal Case for Breaching the Lower Snake River Dams, Lower John Day Reservoir, and Restor-
ing National River Flows, 28 ENVTL. L. 997, 1045 (1998). For a discussion of the “survival” and
“recovery” aspects of the ESA, see, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434,
441–42 (5th Cir. 2001) (defining “conservation” under the ESA as including not just sur-
vival, but also recovery). See also Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
378 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he ESA was enacted not merely to forestall the
extinction of species . . . , but to allow a species to recover to the point where it may be
delisted.”).
290. Engelson, supra note 132; Press Release, supra note 143; Lewis, supra note 31, at 284. R
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that degrade salmon habitat, including steep-slope logging, public lands
grazing, and floodplain development.291 Given the sorry state of
salmonid habitat in the Pacific Northwest, the litigation opportunities are
immense.
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE COMMON SENSE OF THE
MARTINEZ DECISION
The Martinez Decision represents the most significant development
in treaty fishing rights litigation since the Supreme Court’s affirmation of
Judge Boldt 30 years ago. Over the years, at least 20 federal judges have
found a corollary right to protect salmon habitat from degradation that
would preclude the tribes’ ability to make a moderate living from fishing
embedded within the treaty fishing right.292 Although the Martinez Deci-
sion constitutes the first time a judge squarely addressed the question of
whether habitat is protected by treaty fishing rights within a particular-
ized factual scenario, the decision is consistent with dozens of cases
stretching back to 1905. Thus, the Martinez Decision is not an outlier but
is, in fact, the logical result of judicial antecedents beginning with the
Winans decision in 1905.293
As the Supreme Court in Winans observed, the treaty fishing right
is an important property right, which we have described as a piscary
291. Federal statutes like the Clean Water Act have proved ineffective with regard to
grazing-related water quality problems. See Peter M. Lacy, Addressing Water Pollution from
Livestock Grazing after ONDA v. Dombeck: Legal Strategies Under the Clean Water Act, 30
ENVTL. L. 617, 623–24 (2000). Tribes could use the treaty fishing right to address such
habitat degradation. Similarly, although conservation groups have used the ESA to address
habitat degradation resulting from rampant floodplain development, tribes could use the
treaty fishing right to prevent development that impedes their ability to make a moderate
living from fishing where unlisted runs exist. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Fed. Emergency
Mgmt. Agency, 345 F. Supp.2d 1151 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (holding that implementation of
National Flood Insurance Program requires section 7 consultation under ESA). The same is
true with respect to addressing logging in riparian areas, which can introduce sediment to
salmon-bearing streams. See, e.g., Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Assoc. v. Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 71 F. Supp.2d 1063 (W.D. Wash. 1999), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 265 F.3d
1028 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding and setting aside aspects of a New Mexico Forest Service
biological opinion related to several federal timber sales on national forest land).
292. See supra notes 110–117, 118–130, 190–209, and 216–233, and accompanying text. R
Only one federal magistrate, whose opinion was adopted by the federal district court, has
ever concluded the treaty fishing right did not require that habitat-degrading activity be
enjoined. See Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp.791 (D. Idaho 1994). For a
critique of this opinion and an explanation of the reasons why the opinion is inconsistent
with prior treaty fishing opinions, see SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 267–71. R
293. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). See also supra Parts I, II, III, V, VI
(describing history of treaty fishing rights litigation in Pacific Northwest, including expla-
nation of treatment of habitat degradation).
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profit.294 Judge Martinez’s decision is likewise consistent with common
law principles of profit and waste law, which preclude unreasonable in-
terference with the exercise of the profit.295 The treaty fishing right thus
prevents the state of Washington from constructing and maintaining cul-
verts that block fish passage and unreasonably interfere with tribes’ abil-
ity to earn a moderate living from fishing.296
Until the Martinez Decision, treaty fishing rights law required an
allocation of a harvest share to the tribes that included both hatchery and
wild fish, yet apparently countenanced destruction of this resource. The
effect of the Martinez Decision will be to rectify this fundamental unfair-
ness by providing tribes a judicial remedy for habitat damage that threat-
ens their fishing livelihoods; a livelihood that they bargained to keep in
return for ceding most of the Pacific Northwest for non-native
settlement.
Through the Martinez Decision, the Puget Sound tribes have
charted a path for all tribes with reserved fishing rights under the Ste-
vens treaties to force meaningful salmon restoration efforts from the
state and federal governments (and even from private parties) that will
benefit both Indian and non-Indian salmon fishers. The tribes have exer-
cised remarkable restraint over the past few decades, exploring negotia-
tion and co-management strategies rather than litigation.297 They have
shown a willingness to accept budgetary practicalities and do not seem
intent to “turn back the clock” to the relatively pristine habitat existing at
the time of the treaties’ signing.298 After Judge Martinez issued his opin-
ion, Billy Frank, Jr., longtime chairman of the Northwest Indian Fisheries
Commission, said:
In order for us all to live together, we are not turning the lights
off. But we have to do a better job at what we are doing. We
have to have the leadership and the guts to make it happen,
and we haven’t had the political will for salmon in this
state. . . . We need the political will to bring the salmon back
and have a home when they get here.299
294. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381. See also supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text; SACRIFIC- R
ING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 270–72, 276 (describing nature of piscary profit and the R
“no unreasonable interference” standard).
295. See generally supra notes 252–54 and accompanying text. R
296. United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), 2007 WL 2437166, at *6, 10 (W.D.
Wash. 2007).
297. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. R
298. Mapes, supra note 157 (quoting Billy Frank, Jr.). R
299. Id.
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With Judge Martinez’s decision, perhaps the tribes can leverage more of
the political will the region needs to restore the salmon and fulfill the
treaty obligations made so long ago.
